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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The  wave  of  globalization  in  past  decades  has  dramatically  changed  the  way 
firms  do  business.  With  the  opening  up  of  new  markets,  tariff  reductions,  and  the 
dismantling of protectionist regimes across the globe, firms have increasingly expanded 
their businesses beyond home markets. Scholarly interest in the various decisions that 
cause and accompany such foreign expansion has not trailed behind either. 
This dissertation consists of three studies on the entry and evolution of foreign 
firms in a new market. The common thread through these three essays is a focus on the 
scope of the foreign firm in a host country, and on how this scope is shaped by local 
firms and environments. I examine the scope of the foreign entrant both in terms of its 
economic boundaries – what it ‘makes’ and what it ‘buys’-, as well as in terms of its 
product-market footprint – the product segments it occupies in the host country market.  
In  particular,  I  examine  two  different  strategic  decisions  firms  make  when 
entering  a  new  country.  The  first  is  the  choice  between  contractual  and  equity 
governance modes in strategic alliances with domestic firms, and the second, the decision 
of  which  market  segments  to  enter  in  the  host  country.  Both  these  strategic  choices 
influence the scope of the firm. By choosing an equity alliance over a licensing contract, 
a firm essentially expands its boundaries; it increases the range of activities organized in-
house as opposed to externally. And by deciding to enter yet another market segment, a 
firm expands its product-market scope. Across  the three  essays in this  dissertation, I 
examine  how  local  firms  or  local  environments  in  the  host  country  influence  these 
decisions. 
The  first  essay  looks  at  the  choice  between  contractual  and  equity  forms  of 
governance in technology transfer alliances between foreign and local firms in India, and   2 
at how the technology capability of the local Indian partner influences this choice. The 
second examines whether and why a foreign firm will enter a particular market segment 
of the US automobile industry. Here I explore the role of the local environment – e.g., the 
presence of other firms, the barriers to entry into the segment, the extent of multi-market 
competition the firm faces in the segment, etc. In the third essay I look at aggregate entry 
rates  of  foreign  firms  into  various  market  segments  of  the  US  auto  industry,  again 
emphasizing the influence of the number of various types of incumbents in the segment. 
The thesis is comprised of five chapters. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 report the research 
that  constitutes  this  dissertation,  while  chapter  5  draws  together  key  findings  and 
implications and suggests avenues for future research.  
 
1.1   RESEARCH QUESTIONS, SEQUENCE, AND KEY FINDINGS 
Firms sometimes need to ally with local firms when entering new markets. While 
that is clear, we know relatively little about what form of governance this alliance should 
adopt.  The  literature  on  alliance  governance  (e.g.,  Oxley  1997;  1999;  Pisano  1989), 
mostly from a transaction cost theory standpoint, focuses on alliance-level determinants 
such as its functional and geographic scope and tells us little about how firm capabilities 
influence the governance decision. The first essay seeks to rectify this, and examines the 
effect of technology capabilities of the local firm on the choice between contractual and 
equity  forms  of  governance,  that  is  between  licensing  and  equity  joint  ventures, 
controlling for characteristics of the technology being shared. Essentially, we argue that 
the  information  and  appropriation  costs  associated  with  technology  transactions  vary 
with  both  knowledge  characteristics  and  the  technology  assimilation  capabilities  of 
recipient firms. We test our hypotheses using survey data from 126 alliances between 
foreign and domestic Indian firms and find that when the ability of the recipient Indian   3 
firms to assimilate the technology being transferred is poor the alliance takes the form of 
an equity joint venture as opposed to a licensing contract. This, we argue, is because poor 
capabilities call for the foreign partner to transfer supporting skills to help the recipient 
absorb the core technology. Because most of these skills are tacit, their transfer through 
contractual  means  is  fraught  with  information  problems  and  the  hazard-mitigating 
properties of equity governance become necessary.  
The second essay moves on to study the product-market scope of foreign firms in 
a host country. Product markets are rarely homogeneous, but typically characterized by 
market segments across which buyers have different tastes and preferences. The product 
market scope of a firm at any given time is made up of successive decisions it has taken 
in the past on whether or not to enter (or exit) a given segment. Ceteris paribus, the more 
segments a firm chooses to enter, the larger its product scope. This paper examines the 
determinants of these entry decisions. Drawing from the strategic management, strategic 
momentum, population ecology and industrial organization perspectives, I predict that a 
foreign firm’s propensity to enter a given segment in the host country in a particular year 
depends on the extent of its multi-market contact with rivals and its prior experience in 
that segment, and on the number of other participants in that segment – i.e. the segment 
density. I test these hypotheses using data on segment entries by foreign manufacturers in 
the US automobile industry over nearly two decades (1986 - 2003). The analyses suggest 
that all the above determinants are relevant. Multi-market competition and the firm’s 
prior entries into a segment have non-monotonic effects; prior entry has a positive but 
diminishing effect on segment entry while that of multi-market competition follows an 
inverted U shaped pattern, increasing initially  and then decreasing after a point. The 
number of other participants in the segment has a deterring effect on a firm’s propensity 
to enter. These findings corroborate multi-market competition, strategic momentum and   4 
spatial competition predictions. I find only limited support for the population ecology 
perspective, which predicts an inverted U-shaped effect for segment density.   
The limited support for the population ecology perspective is intriguing. Hence, I 
explore this further in the third essay. I use another econometric specification which is 
commonly used in population ecology research on organizational founding and, more 
importantly,  explore  the  boundaries  to  the  density  effect.  Traditionally,  density 
dependence theorists have assumed that the processes of legitimation and competition, 
which are the key drivers of the density dependence effect, operate at the level of the 
overall  population.  Recent  studies,  however,  have  started  to  emphasize  spatial 
heterogeneity in populations and have suggested that the density effect operates at the 
level of national subunits, such as regions and cities (Cattani et.al, 2003; Lomi, 1995; 
Carroll & Wade, 1991). I take this advance forward and emphasize two alternative levels 
of aggregation that serve as boundaries to legitimation and competition forces and hence 
to  the  density  effect.  First,  industries  can  be  disaggregated  into  segments,  which 
correspond to homogeneous types of demand. I argue that the density effect is stronger at 
the segment level than at the industry level, i.e., among firms that depend on similar 
kinds of buyers. Second, I propose that density effects do not affect all firms equally 
strongly but will be strongest among firms that share similar identities. And since foreign 
firms share similar identities vis-a-vis domestic firms, density effects will be stronger 
within the sub-population of foreign firms, rather than across foreign and domestic firms. 
My results from analysing data on entry rates of foreign firms into segments of the US 
automobile industry support these notions.  
  First,  I  find  support  for  my  density  dependence  predictions.  This  appears  to 
contradict the finding in chapter three and needs to be discussed further. I do this in 
chapter 5, after reporting details of both analyses in chapters 3, and 4. Second, I find that   5 
density dependence effects are stronger at the segment level compared to the population 
or industry level which prior research has traditionally used. And third, I find that entry 
rates of foreign firms are more sensitive to the number of foreign participants in the 
segment  than  to  the  whole  population  of  the  segment.  Taken  together,  the  last  two 
findings  suggest  that  lower  levels  of  aggregation  such  as  the  segment  and  the  sub-
population  of  foreign  firms  are  better  levels  of  analysis  to  study  density-dependent 
processes.  
 
1.2 THE BIG PICTURE: A NOTE ON COHERENCE BETWEEN CHAPTERS 
The essays in this dissertation are heterogeneous to some extent. All three papers 
do not share the same research question, theoretical core, research design, or empirical 
setting. In writing the dissertation, I focussed more on the individual contributions of the 
essays than on their collective common identity; each essay was meant to ‘stand-alone’. 
Nevertheless, there are clear commonalities between the papers. At first glance, chapters 
three and four are similar – they both explore the decisions of foreign firms to enter 
market segments, albeit at different levels of analysis. 
At a more fundamental level, all three papers address the issue of the scope of the 
foreign firm in the host country market. While the first essay addresses economic scope, 
the second and third explore product market scope. And while determinants of scope 
vary across all three papers, at a fundamental level they emphasize the local firm. In the 
first paper I study the effect of the local firm’s capabilities. In the second and third, I am 
still interested in the effect of firms in the local environment, but in a more aggregated, 
than individual effect.  
The  other  way  the  three  essays  hold  together  is  in  their  positioning  within 
international business research, and in particular, in the stream on foreign market entry.   6 
The central phenomenon foreign market entry research seeks to address is the location 
and distribution of foreign entries. Some scholars are interested in the distribution of 
foreign entries across geographic space and study questions pertaining to the location of 
FDI, either within a host country or globally. The three essays in this dissertation also 
address the location and distribution of foreign entries, first in governance space, and 
then in product space. In this sense, they complement each other as well as add to extant 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
RECIPIENT TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITY, KNOWLEDGE 
HETEROGENEITY AND GOVERNANCE CHOICE IN TECHNOLOGY 
ALLIANCES: 





This essay examines the choice between joint ventures and licensing contracts to 
govern  strategic  technology  alliances  between  foreign  and  domestic  firms.  Extant 
research  has  predicated  this  choice  on  alliance-level  characteristics,  such  as  their 
functional or geographic scope, giving relatively short shrift to technology characteristics 
and  recipient  firm  capabilities.  In  this  paper  we  argue  that  the  information  and 
appropriation costs associated with technology transactions vary with both technology 
characteristics and the technology assimilation capabilities of recipient firms. We test our 
hypotheses using survey data on technology transfer alliances between foreign and local 
firms in India, an empirical setting which provides variation in our core constructs. We 
find that recipient technology assimilation capabilities significantly influence the choice 
of  governance  form.  We  also  find  that,  in  our  sample,  contractual  hazards  rooted  in 
information asymmetries are much more significant determinants of governance choice 
than those based on potential knowledge misappropriation. 
 
                                                 
1 This chapter is the result of joint work with Jean-François Hennart. 
We thank Xavier Martin, Paulo Cunha and Arjen Slangen, and seminar participants at 
HEC  Paris,  the  University  of  New  South  Wales,  and  at  the  2003  Academy  of 
Management and Academy of International Business Meetings, for their comments on an 
earlier version of this chapter. 
   10     
2.1   INTRODUCTION 
To  exploit  their  firm  specific  advantages  in  foreign  countries,  Multinational 
Enterprises  (MNEs)  need  to  combine  those  advantages  with  local  assets,  such  as 
distribution  networks,  market  knowledge,  locally-known  brand  names,  and  factors  of 
production  such  as  land,  labor,  and  utilities,  among  others.    In  some  cases  such 
complementary assets can be obtained on the local market. In others they are held by 
local firms. One important way MNEs can then access them is by allying with the local 
firms that own them. Such alliances can take two main forms: an arm’s length contract 
(e.g. the MNE licensing the local firm), or an equity joint venture, where the MNE and 
the local firm are jointly responsible for the management of the operation and are paid for 
their contribution through a share in the results (Hennart, 1988). While the need to enter 
into alliances with local firms in distant markets seems well accepted, we know a lot less 
about the form that these alliances should take. Specifically, under what circumstances 
should the strategic alliance between MNEs and incumbent firms be contractual rather 
than equity-based?  
The mainstream literature on the  governance form of  alliances (Pisano, 1989; 
Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Oxley, 1997; Gulati & Singh, 1998; Pangarkar & Klein, 2001) 
predicts  governance  form  from  alliance-level  features  such  as  its  technological, 
geographic, and functional scope. Oxley (1997), for example, argues that alliances that 
transfer  multiple  technologies  or  span  multiple  geographies  –  and  thus  have  broad 
technological or  geographic scope – are more  likely to take the form  of equity joint 
ventures than that of contractual agreements. Pisano (1989) argues that the functional 
content  of  the  alliance  matters;  for  example,  R&D  alliances  are  more  likely  to  be 
governed through equity than through contract. While this focus on variations in alliance-
scope is indeed useful, prior research on alliance governance has underemphasized two   11     
additional types of variation across technology alliances: variation in characteristics of 
the  technology  being  transferred,  and  in  the  recipient’s  technology  assimilation 
capability. These two constructs are not entirely new. When examining the boundaries of 
the firm, scholars have emphasized the effect of technology characteristics such as its age 
and tacitness (Davidson & McFetridge, 1985; Kogut & Zander, 1993; Arora & Fosfuri, 
2000), as well as the capabilities of technology recipients (Martin & Salomon, 2003; 
Szulanski,  1996;  Madhok,  1996).  Studies  that  specifically  study  the  role  of  these 
constructs on the governance form of alliances, however, are rare (but see Colombo, 
2003; Sampson, 2004).  
  In this paper, we examine how the characteristics of technology transferred and 
the  technology  assimilation  capabilities  of  the  recipient  affect  the  governance  form 
chosen for an alliance. Our argument rests on the transaction cost notion that when the 
contractual hazards associated with technology exchange are high, contractual forms are 
less efficient, and need to be replaced by equity forms of governance (Hennart, 1988; 
Oxley, 1997). We argue that the extent of contractual hazards in technology transfer 
alliances varies with the characteristics of the transferred technology as well as with the 
assimilation capabilities of technology recipients. We test our hypotheses using survey 
data  on  technology  transfer  alliances  between  foreign  multinational  and  Indian 
manufacturing firms. 
Our  results  show  that,  controlling  for  the  characteristics  of  the  technology 
transferred,  the  technology  assimilation  capabilities  of  Indian  recipients  significantly 
influence  the  choice  of  governance  form.  Weak  recipient  capabilities  correlate 
significantly with a higher incidence of equity as opposed to contractual governance. 
Equally  importantly,  our  results  suggest  that  it  is  contractual  hazards  rooted  in   12     
information  asymmetries  rather  than  those  based  on  potential  knowledge 
misappropriation that are determinant in our sample.  
In  summary,  this  research  contributes  to  the  alliance  governance  literature  by 
carefully examining the effects on the choice between contractual and equity transfer of 
technology characteristics and recipient capability, two types of cross-sectional variation 
that prior research has largely overlooked. We also contribute to transaction cost theory 
by showing that the relevant sources of contractual hazards in technology transactions are 
context dependent. In samples from lesser-developed countries such as ours, information 
costs rather than appropriation concerns underlie contractual hazards. Finally, this is to 
the best of our knowledge the first transaction-level study to examine the choice between 
contractual  and  equity  alliances in  India.  We  thus  add  to  our  currently  quite  limited 
knowledge  on  knowledge  transfer  between  foreign  and  local  firms  in  emerging 
economies (Tse, et. al 1997; Hagedoorn and Sedaitis, 1998; Meyer, 2001).  
 
2.2  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.2.1   Transaction Cost Economics, Information and Appropriation concerns 
Transaction  cost  theory  has  been  a  dominant  perspective  in  the  literature  on 
strategic alliances (Hennart, 1988; 1991; Pisano, 1989; Oxley, 1997; Pangarkar & Klein, 
2001;  Colombo,  2003;  Sampson,  2004).  The  basic  tenet  of  the  theory  is  that  due  to 
limitedly rational and opportunistic dispositions of economic agents (Williamson, 1985), 
not every transaction can be efficiently organized on the market. Transactions sometimes 
involve  high  contractual  hazards  and  are  therefore  more  efficiently  organized  within 
firms than through the market. Since transactions differ in severity of contractual hazards 
and governance structures vary in hazard-mitigating properties, the core proposition of   13     
the theory is that transactions should be aligned with the most appropriate governance 
structure (Williamson, 1991).  
In this paper, we examine two types of contractual hazards in strategic technology 
alliances: information costs, which arise from information asymmetries between partners 
(Arrow, 1974; Hennart, 1989), and appropriation concerns, which are due to less than 
perfect definition and enforcement of property rights (Levin et.al., 1987; Oxley, 1997; 
Hennart, 2000; Sampson, 2004). 
Information and appropriation costs arise when it is difficult to define the good 
being transacted and monitor the activities of the parties. Under neo-classical perfect 
market conditions, actors are perfectly rational and have perfect information about the 
attributes of the good being transacted. Under such conditions, prices act as an organizing 
principle,  and  market  transactions  are  frictionless.  However,  in  real  life,  the  above 
conditions do not always hold. In technology alliances, recipients often have less than 
perfect information about the characteristics of the technology being transacted and its 
potential performance and, consequently, tend to under-price it. The seller, on the other 
hand, cannot reveal all his knowledge before the contract is signed, for fear that by so 
doing the recipient gets the know-how essentially free of cost. Together with the fact that 
buyers  are  limited  in  their  abilities  to  identify  ex-ante  if  the  seller  might  act 
opportunistically, by, for example, not supplying the know-how in its fullest form or 
concealing  potentially  dangerous  or  problematic  characteristics  of  the  technology, 
information asymmetries of this kind cause the market for knowledge to fail, and call for 
further  contractual  safeguards.  Arrow  (1962;  1974;  1984)  called  this  ‘buyer’s 
uncertainty’, and these kinds of contractual difficulties are particularly pertinent when it 
is difficult to properly define the knowledge, such as when a large portion of it is tacit 
(Hennart, 1982; 1989).     14     
The seller, on the other hand, worries about potential misappropriation  of the 
know-how  transferred,  i.e.,  its  use  in  ways  not  mentioned  in  the  contract  and  hence 
essentially unpaid for. While specific stipulations in the contract and patenting should 
mitigate these concerns, it is often costly, difficult, or time consuming to detect and prove 
contract violations in a court of law. This gives rise to positive appropriability concerns 
(Teece, 1986; Levin et.al, 1988; Oxley, 1997), which constitutes a contractual hazard.  
 
2.2.2.  Contractual hazard mitigation in equity alliances 
One way to mitigate contractual hazard is to reduce the incentives of agents to 
cheat by organizing the transaction within the firm, thus replacing the market mechanism 
with hierarchy (Hennart 1982; 2000). Considering different organizational forms on a 
continuum between markets and hierarchies, joint ventures are closer to the hierarchical 
solution  while  licensing  contracts  retain  properties  more  characteristic  of  the  market 
mode of organization (Hennart, 1993). Joint ventures have superior hazard-mitigating 
properties because, in a joint venture, the seller is not paid upfront for the technology. 
Rather, both parties are paid out of the residual profits of the venture and hence have less 
incentive  to  cheat.  In  a  licensing  agreement,  on  the  other  hand,  licensors  have  only 
limited financial interest in the profitability of licensees, as licensors are paid for their 
technology  through  a  lump  sum  and  through  a  percentage  of  sales,  not  of  profits 
(Hennart, 1988; 1989). Furthermore, joint ventures provide better avenues for closely 
monitoring partner behaviour through participation in the board of directors of the JV 
(Oxley, 1997; Sampson, 2004). 
Figure  2.1  summarizes  the  argument  we  develop  in  the  next  section  that 
information and appropriation costs faced by parties negotiating a technology transfer – 
and  hence,  their  proclivity  towards  joint  ventures  –  depend  on  the  technology   15     
assimilation capability of the recipient firm (c.f., Martin and Salomon, 2003) and the 
characteristics of the technology transferred (Davidson and McFetridge, 1985; Arora and 











2.3  HYPOTHESES 
2.3.1  Recipient technology capability, effective technology package and 
information and appropriation costs 
Prior research on governance choice in strategic alliances has given short shrift to 
differences  in  recipient  capabilities,  assuming  partner  firm  capabilities  to  be  largely 
homogenous across alliances. Yet, the technology assimilation capacity of recipient firms 
varies from alliance to alliance.  
The few studies that have looked at capabilities tend to examine divergence in 
technological capabilities between partners (Colombo, 2003; Sampson, 2004). Following 
Jaffe (1989) and Mowery et.al (1998), this has been measured by the extent to which the 
patent  portfolios  of  both  partners  overlap,  with  a  greater  overlap  in  patent  portfolios 
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limitations. First, while it tells us the extent to which the overall technology capabilities 
of  firms  overlap,  it  gives  us  little  insight  into  how  they  overlap  for  the  specific 
technology being transferred in the alliance. Second, the measure only maps overlap in 
patentable skills. Yet, as we will argue below, gaps in tacit skills may be much more 
crucial in determining the choice of alliance form.  
We  therefore  think  that  a  more  promising  way  to  model  differences  in  firm 
capabilities is to look at the ‘effective technology package’ being transferred. Successful 
transfer  of  commercial  technology  requires  that  the  technology  recipient  be  able  to 
incorporate the technology in a product and service which can be profitably sold. This 
requires that the recipient possess not only an understanding of the technology itself, but 
also a mastery of the many other ‘supporting skills’ (e.g., planning, logistics, marketing, 
and  management  skills)  which  are  necessary  for  successfully  implementing  the 
technology (Baranson, 1969). Recipients differ in the extent to which they possess these 
supporting  skills.  Whenever  transfer  takes  place  between  firms  that  have  the  same 
supporting skills, the only knowledge that needs to be transferred is ‘technology stricto 
sensu’.  When  recipients  do  not  possess  these  supporting  skills,  then  successful 
technology  transfer  requires  the  transfer  of  both  ‘technology  stricto  sensu’  and  the 
associated ‘supporting skills’ that are necessary to profitably sell the product in the local 
market  (we  will  call  this  overall  package  the  ‘effective  technology  package’).  The 
effective technology package transferred is thus not generally equivalent to ‘technology 
stricto sensu’, but may include a variable amount of supporting skills depending on the 
recipient’s capabilities. 
  Many  of  these  supporting  skills  are  tacit  and  their  transfer  can  entail  severe 
information problems since it is difficult to completely define and specify them a priori 
(Arrow, 1962; Hill, Hwang & Kim, 1990; Hennart, 2000). Hence the greater the range of   17     
supporting skills needed by the technology recipient, the higher information costs, and 
the more likely that the transaction will be more efficiently organized in an equity joint 
venture (Davies, 1977; Killing, 1980; Caves, Crookel & Killing, 1983; Pisano, 1989). 
Reduction in information cost for a given change in recipient technology capability is 
significant  at  lower  than  at  higher  levels  of  recipient  capability.  For  technologically 
capable recipients that already have many of the basic skills, subsequent improvement in 
capabilities contributes relatively less in terms of reducing information problems. 
However,  while  the  recipient’s  lack  of  supporting  skills  increases  the  overall 
tacitness of the ‘effective technology package’,  the information asymmetries between 
sender  and  recipient,  and  correspondingly,  the  information  costs  associated  with  the 
exchange, there might be an offsetting effect. The more similar the knowledge base of 
the  partners,  the  more  beneficial  it  is  for  them  to  appropriate  knowledge  from  their 
partners  in  ways  which  are  not  covered  by  the  contract.  In  other  words,  the  more 
recipients have the needed supporting skills, the more likely they are to compete with the 
transferor  in  unauthorized  ways,  and  hence  the  greater  the  threat  of  knowledge 
misappropriation  (Colombo,  2003).  However,  the  same  magnitude  of  increase  in 
recipient  capability  is  likely  to  result  in  greater  misappropriation  concerns  at  higher 
levels  of  recipient  capability  than  at  lower  levels.    In  other  words,  concerns  about 
misappropriation are likely to increase exponentially rather than linearly with recipient 
technology capability. 
Given that information costs and appropriation costs move in opposite directions 
as the recipient’s technological assimilation capabilities range from weak to strong, and 
hence as the recipient’s needs for supporting skills decreases, we predict a U-shaped 
effect  of  recipient’s  technology  assimilation  capabilities  on  the  probability  to  joint 
venture. When the recipient firm has technology capabilities that approach those of the   18     
sender,  the  appropriation  hazards  are  high,  necessitating  the  incentive  alignment  and 
safeguards inherent in joint ventures. As recipient capabilities become weaker, the risk of 
misappropriation  diminishes,  making  the  probability  of  joint  venture  less  likely. 
However, as recipient capabilities become weaker, it becomes more and more necessary 
for the sender to enhance the ‘effective technology package’ to include tacit supporting 
skills. The tacit component in the technology package increases the information costs 
surrounding exchange, and at a certain level of recipient firm capabilities, increasing 
information costs override decreasing appropriation costs and cause the transaction cost 
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Figure 2.2 illustrates this relationship. Line AA represents the information costs 
curve while BB is the appropriation cost curve. CC, the sum of the two, represents the 
total  contractual  hazard  curve  which  is  U-shaped  and  varies  with  the  technology 
capability of the technology recipient.  
There  is  an  inverse  relationship  between  a  recipient’s  technology  assimilation 
capability  and  the  range  of  supporting  skills  it  needs:  the  lower  the  recipient’s 
capabilities, the wider the range of the effective technology package and supporting skills 
it needs (and vice-versa). Hence, from a transaction cost standpoint, we predict that: 
H1: The technology recipient’s need for supporting skills has a U shaped effect 
on the probability that the alliance will take the form of a joint venture rather 
than that of licensing contract. 
2.3.2  Technology heterogeneity and transaction costs 
A  second  source  of  variation  across  technology  transfer  alliances  is  in  the 
characteristics of the technology being transferred. A number of authors have explored 
how  some  dimensions  of  knowledge,  such  as  its  codifiability  and  age,  affect  the 
probability that it will be transferred internally rather than through licensing contracts 
(Davidson  &  McFetridge,  1985;  Kogut  &  Zander,  1993;  Arora  &  Fosfuri,  2000). 
However,  these  studies  have  typically  not  controlled  for  the  technology  assimilation 
capacities of technology recipients. There could potentially be correlations between these 
assimilation  capabilities  and  the  type  of  knowledge  transferred.  For  example,  it  is 
plausible  that  highly  complex  and  tacit  knowledge  is  transferred  to  recipients  with 
superior  technology  assimilation  capabilities  while  fairly  less  complex  codified 
technologies are transferred to recipients with lesser technological capabilities. In earlier   20     
models where recipient’s technology capabilities are not explicitly controlled for, it then 
becomes difficult to separate the independent effects of technology characteristics from 
that  of  recipient’s  technology  assimilation  capability.  To  take  care  of  this  potential 
conflation, we simultaneously include both these variables in our model. 
As argued earlier, Arrow (1974) has pointed out that the basic problem in selling 
or renting knowledge is that the buyer does not know what he is buying.  As Hennart 
(1982)  has  shown,  patents  are  an  imperfect  solution  to  this  information  asymmetry 
problem, because they allow the owner of know-how to make it public—thus reducing 
information asymmetry over its value—while, in theory, retaining full property rights 
over it. Because patents reduce the information asymmetry that accompanies the sale of 
knowledge, while providing monopoly rights in its use, they make it possible to lend 
knowledge to unaffiliated parties, i.e. to license it. But patenting (and hence licensing) 
has limitations whose severity tends to vary across knowledge types. First, the efficacy of 
patenting  depends  on  the  codifiability  of  the  know-how.  Patenting  means  putting 
knowledge on paper and tacit knowledge is therefore not patentable. Hence the patent 
system works well for highly codifiable knowledge, such as chemical formulae, but less 
well for tacit knowledge, such as marketing know-how (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et. al., 
1997; Arora et al., 2001 a,b).  
H2: The less codifiable the technology transferred, the higher the probability of 
its transfer through joint ventures rather than through licensing. 
H3:  Non-Patented  technologies  are  more  likely  to  be  exploited  through  joint 
venture than by licensing 
Whether the technology was initially tacit or explicit, the amount of information 
available on it should increase with the passage of time. Older technologies are likely to 
have been implemented into products that have been put up for sale. They have a track   21     
record. Hence, a buyer’s ignorance of a technology, and the relative advantage of joint 
ventures  over  licensing,  should  decrease  with  the  age  of  a  technology  (Teece,  1977; 
Davidson  &  McFetridge,  1984).  Furthermore,  older  technologies  are  less  crucial  to 
transferors (Telesio, 1979), and their misappropriation by the recipient less of a problem. 
Hence, 
H4: Older technologies are more likely to be transferred through licensing than 
through joint ventures 
The process of technology transfer requires complex skills from both senders and 
receivers.  Senders  must  learn  how  to  transfer  technology,  a  complex  and  costly  task 
(Teece, 1977). One of the reasons is that successful technology transfer requires subtle 
adaptations to a host of local factors and conditions: the chemical composition of raw 
materials  may  differ,  climatic  conditions  may  require  changes,  the  relative  prices  of 
factors of production may require technological modifications. Hence the first transfer 
can involve significant costs, but once these teething problems have been solved, their 
solution is likely to be codified, thus reducing the cost of subsequent transfers (Teece, 
1977) and facilitating transfer through licensing. Prior transfer of knowledge also implies 
greater  public  knowledge  of  its  characteristics  (Davidson  &  McFetridge,  1985),  thus 
reducing information asymmetries between transferor and transferee, and encouraging 
licensing. Hence, 
H5: Prior transfers of technology by the source firm increase the probability that 
subsequent transfers will take place through licensing rather than through joint 
ventures 
Licensing can be described as renting the right to access technology. But while a 
rented car that a renter fails to return can be repossessed, the same cannot be said of 
rented knowledge. Hence a major problem faced by knowledge transferors is that the   22     
knowledge can be used by the recipient to compete with the transferor. Both licensing 
and joint venture contracts cannot fully safeguard against this problem: licensees can 
compete with licensors at the expiration of the licensing contracts, while joint venture 
partners can dissolve the joint venture at any time and start competing with it (Reich and 
Mankin, 1986). There is however two crucial differences between the two. First, joint 
venture partners are represented in the Board of Directors of the joint venture and they 
have the right to post their employees in the joint venture. They have therefore more 
opportunities to control the transfer of technology to their partners than in a case of a 
licensing  agreement.  Second,  joint  ventures  provide  better  incentive  alignment  than 
licensing contracts since partner rewards consist in a share of the profits of the joint 
venture. They will therefore pay a penalty in the form of lower returns if by their actions 
they undermine the profitability of the joint venture.  We would expect this advantage of 
joint ventures to be particularly important whenever the knowledge transferred is core to 
the transferor. Transferors are more likely to generate future products and processes in 
core than in non-core lines, and hence the risk of misappropriation of knowledge by the 
partner is greater in the former than in the latter (Telesio, 1979). 
Consequently, the closer the know-how to be transferred is to the technology 
transferor’s core business, the more likely its transfer will be through equity modes rather 
than through licensing (Davidson & McFetridge, 1985). Telesio’s (1979) and Blomstrom 
& Zejan’s (1989) findings that technology transferors with a wider product line tend to 
be more active licensers are also broadly supportive. Hence:      
H6: Technology core to the transferor is more likely to be exploited through joint 
ventures than through licensing 
While  transferors  may  be  more  wary  about  misappropriation  when  core 
technologies  are  transferred,  they  are  less  likely  to  have  such  concerns  when  the   23     
technology is core to the recipient. Misappropriating technology may bring short term 
gains to the recipient, but it also creates distrust and rules out the possibility of any future 
transfers  of  technology  from  the  sender.  When  the  technology  transfer  is  for  key 
operations, the recipient would want to have access to future flows of newer versions of 
the  technology  as  well  as  to  continuing  technical  and  management  support  from  the 
sender. In such situations, given the risk of losing future support from the sender, the 
recipient  is  less  likely  to  behave  opportunistically  and  misappropriate  the  technology 
being transferred (Madhok, 1996). Consequently, appropriation concerns for the sender 
are low and there is less need for the contractual safeguards inherent in a JV: 
  H7a:  Technology  core  to  the  recipient  firm  is  more  likely  to  be  transferred 
through licensing than through joint ventures  
  The prediction is the opposite, however, when we think in terms of information 
costs  instead  of  appropriation  concerns.  Information  costs  arise  when  the  buyer  has 
imperfect knowledge of the technology being transferred and is wary about the seller 
misrepresenting its value and performance potential. The recipient has more to lose from 
the poor performance of technologies related to its core operations and consequently will 
be  particularly  cautious  about  misrepresentation  by  the  seller.  When  information 
concerns are high in such situations – i.e., where the technology being transferred is core 
to the recipient – contracts cease to be efficient ways to organize the transaction. A joint 
venture, where both the sender’s and recipient’s returns depend on the successful transfer 
of the technology, aligns incentives of both buyer and seller and alleviates some of these 
contractual problems. Hence: 
  H7b: Technology core to the recipient firm is more likely to be exploited through joint 
ventures than through licensing 
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2.4  METHODS 
2.4.1  Research design 
We test the preceding hypotheses on a sample of technology alliances between 
foreign and Indian firms. Since the opening up of the economy to foreign investment in 
1991,  Indian  firms  have  increasingly  entered  into  technology  transfer  alliances  with 
foreign firms, making India an interesting context to explore our ideas. Besides, there is 
ample variation in the technology capabilities of Indian firms. While some firms such as 
Ranbaxy  in  pharmaceuticals  and  Infosys  and  Wipro  in  information  technology  have 
achieved world class levels of technology proficiency, others are technologically weak. 
Hence our setting offers sufficient variation in the technology assimilation capabilities of 
incumbent firms. To get adequate variation on the technology variables and to maximize 
potential response rate we sampled across industries. 
 
2.4.2  Sample 
Prior  studies  on  the  governance  of  strategic  alliance  have  largely  relied  on 
secondary data (e.g. the MERIT-CATI database) (Gulati, 1995; Oxley, 1997). However, 
tapping into more micro level technology attributes such as the characteristics of the 
technology and differences in the capabilities and skills held by technology recipients 
requires survey methods of data collection. We sampled from the list of over 7000 Indian 
firms  put  up  by  Capitaline,  one  of  the  two  leading  Indian  corporate  databases.  The 
Capitaline database lists the specific joint ventures and licensing agreements each Indian 
firm has with foreign firms. Nevertheless, since we observed that the database tended to 
focus  on  listed  firms,  we  also  sampled  from  business  directories  of  various  foreign 
chambers of commerce in India (German, French, American and British) to avoid any 
potential sample selection bias. However, we had to limit ourselves to those alliances for   25     
which  a  proper  address  and  name  of  the  Managing  Director  (who  was  to  be  our 
respondent) was available. We identified 1258 such alliances. 
We then sent an announcement card introducing the survey and its objectives, and 
the  actual  survey  a  week  later.    Close  to  450  announcement  cards  were  returned 
indicating that they had failed to reach their targets because the targeted firm had closed 
down or moved to another location. So the first mailing of the survey was directed to the 
remaining 800 firms. After a second wave of mailing, we received 94 filled surveys. One 
of the authors paid personal visits to firms located in Delhi, Bombay and Madras and 
these yielded 32 more responses. Our final sample consists of 126 Indian firms – a 16% 
response rate – of which 75 are local partners in joint ventures with foreign firms and 51 
are licensees of foreign firms. Missing information on some variables led to a further 
reduction in the number of usable observations, which varies from 118 in the baseline to 
107 in the full model. 
To check for non-response bias we performed a t-test for difference in means 
between  a  subset  of  40  respondents  and  355  non-respondents  for  whom  data  was 
available from secondary sources. The two groups did not significantly differ in annual 
sales  and  firm  age  (t  value  was  insignificant  at  p  >  0.10  on  both  variables).  Our 
respondents  were  knowledgeable  about  the  alliance:  63%  were  chairpersons  and 
managing directors of the alliance, and the rest were vice-presidents, general managers or 
full-time directors.  
The final sample is distributed over 20 manufacturing industries. Twenty percent 
of  the  respondents  are  in  the  industrial  and  commercial  machinery  industry,  18%  in 
chemicals and allied products and 12% each in the electronics and electrical equipment 
and  transportation  equipment  industries.  Alliances  are  with  foreign  firms  from  19 
countries with German and U.S firms accounting for the largest share (22% and 21%   26     
respectively).  Whenever  an  Indian  firm  had  multiple  alliances  with  foreign  firm,  we 
asked the respondent to choose one alliance that was most important to the firm. 
    
2.4.3  Measures 
Dependent variable 
In line with prior studies (Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Gulati, 1995) we coded our 
dependent variable JV equal to one if the alliance is a joint venture and zero when it is an 
arm’s length licensing agreement. Any type of alliance that involves foreign equity stakes 
is  officially  categorized  in  India  as  “financial  collaboration”,  while  all  those  without 
equity  stakes  are  called  “technical  collaborations”.  Hence  we  are  sure  that  all  our 
licensing  contracts  are  between  non-affiliated  parties.  Given  the  binary  nature  of  the 
dependent variable we use a logistic regression to estimate the parameters of our model 
(Agresti, 1996; Long, 1997). 
 
Independent variables 
  Data for the independent variables was obtained from responses to the survey. 
Technology Recipient’s Need for Supporting Skills: Our measure of the Indian 
partner’s  technology  assimilation  capability  and  hence  the  extent  to  which  it  needs 
supporting skills was obtained by asking respondents to indicate whether they required 
management,  marketing,  and  other  technical  assistance  to  implement  the  technology 
contributed by the foreign technology transferor. The variable takes the value 1 if only 
one of these three forms of assistance was required, 2 if two were required and 3 when all 
forms were required. A higher value on this measure thus indicates a greater dependency 
on  transfer  of  tacit  supporting  skills  from  the  foreign  firm.  To  test  our  U  shaped 
hypothesis we mean-centered this variable and entered a quadratic term in the regression.   27     
Codifiability: Survey respondents were asked to indicate on  a scale of  1 to 5 
whether  the  technology  being  acquired  in  the  collaboration  could  be  described  in  a 
manual. Higher values on this variable suggest greater codifiability.  
Patent is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the technology has been patented in India 
and 0 if not.  
Age  of  technology:  Our  age  variable  takes  the  value  1  when  the  respondent 
indicated that the transferred technology had been introduced in the transferor’s home 
country within the past year, 2 when it was two to three years old, 3 when it was three to 
five years old and 4 when its first introduction was more than five years ago.  
Prior transfer of know-how: This variable takes a value of 1 if the technology 
transferor transferred the technology in question to India prior to its transfer within the 
present collaboration, either to the responding Indian firm within the framework of an 
earlier alliance or to any other Indian firm, and 0 otherwise. 
Centrality  of  the  transferred  know-how  to  the  technology  recipient:  Survey 
respondents were asked if the technology was core to the recipient Indian firm and this 
was coded 1 when they responded in the affirmative and 0 otherwise.  
Centrality of transferred know-how to the technology transferor: Centrality of 
know-how to the technology transferor is measured by a dummy variable which takes a 
value of 1 when the respondent indicated that the know-how was core to the transferor 
and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables 
A technology transferor who has already been exporting to India at the time of the 
collaboration may be more willing to make greater resource commitments, i.e. to choose 
a joint venture over  a licensing agreement. We control for this with Prior Export, a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent answered that the technology   28     
transferor  had  exported  its  products  to  India  prior to  the  present  collaboration  and  0 
otherwise. 
We use the Kogut and Singh (1988) index of cultural distance to measure and 
control for any potential effect on governance choice of the cultural distance between 
India and the technology transferor’s home country. Indian firms may lack the resources 
to  implement  large-scale  projects  and  may  choose  joint  ventures  with  technology 
transferors to obtain financing. Size of investment reflects the scale of investment needed. 
The variable takes a value of 1 for investments of less than US$10m, 2 for investments 
between  US$  10  and  45m,  3  for  investments  between  US$45  and  110m,  4  for 
investments between US$110 and 220m, and 5 for those above US$ 220m.  
To control for changes in Indian regulations towards incoming foreign investment 
we include a post-liberalization dummy that takes a value of 1 if the collaboration was 
started after 1991, i.e. after many restrictions on foreign equity ownership were lifted, 
and 0 prior to that date.
2 
 
2.5  RESULTS 
Table  2.1  shows  descriptive  statistics  and  pair-wise  correlations  between  the 
variables.  
 
                                                 
2 Given our small sample size and relatively large number of industries, we chose not to 
include  industry  dummies. Nevertheless,  we  probed  our  data  for  industry  effects.  We  relied  on 
variance  partitioning  methods  to  break  down  the  total  variance  in  our  dependent  variable  into 
industry level-variance – variance accounted for at the industry level – and residual variance. Using a 
random-intercept model we estimated both these variances and the intra-class correlation, which 
reveals the extent to which observations are correlated within industry groups. The estimates reveal 
that a very small portion of the variance in our dependent variable is accounted for by industry level 
factors.  The  industry  level  variance  estimate  was  0.0009119  and  this  constituted  a  very  small 
proportion of the total variance. We also ran a chi-square test of difference in proportions of equity 
alliances between industries within an ANOVA framework (this is analogous to testing for industry 
fixed effects) and found no significant difference. It thus appears that in our sample, observations are 
not dangerously correlated within industry and hence our omission of industry dummies is not likely 
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  Correlations between independent variables are not high enough to suggest 
multicollinearity. The highest correlation is between centrality of transferred know-how 
to the technology transferor and centrality of transferred know-how to the technology 
recipient (0.449). Most other correlations are below 0.20. We also mean-centered the 
recipient’s need for skills variable, since we are introducing its quadratic transformation 
in the models (Aiken & West 1991). To examine if the standard errors of our coefficient 
estimates could be inflated by multicollinearity, we also computed Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIF). VIFs for independent variables were found to be below 1.54 with a mean 
of 1.22 and hence quite satisfactory. Nevertheless, we entered our hypothesized variables 
hierarchically into the model to ensure robustness of the results. 
The results of the logit estimation are presented in table 2.2 (standard errors in 
parentheses). A positive sign for the coefficient implies that the corresponding variable 
has  a  positive  effect  on  the  probability  of  choosing  a  joint  venture  over  a  licensing 
agreement and a negative sign implies the contrary.  
Model 1 is the base model with control variables. In model 2 we include the 
recipient’s need for supporting skills and its quadratic term in order to test hypothesis 1. 
Model  3  includes  knowledge  characteristics  while  controlling  for  recipient  capability 
(i.e.,  recipient’s  need  for  supporting  skills)  while  model  4  is  the  full  model  where 
centrality of know-how to recipient and transferor are entered. 
The model likelihood ratio (LR) chi-square (which is analogous to the F statistic 
in multiple regression) is highly significant in all models (p<0.05 for model 1 and p< 
0.01 in all other models) implying that they have significantly higher log likelihoods and 
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Table  2.3  shows  the  proportion  of  correctly  classified  observations  using  the 
estimates  from  each  model.  All  models  appear  to  perform  better  than  a  random 
proportion model which has an accuracy rate of p
2 + (1-p)
  2 (Morrison 1974). On the 
basis of our observed data, we estimated p, the probability of the occurrence of the event, 
as the number of joint ventures over the total number of observations. Since our sample 
sizes vary from model to model, so does our p estimate. For example, in model 3, p= 75 / 
114  =  51.54%,  and  in  model  4,  p=67/107  =  51.58%.  Including  recipient’s  need  for 
supporting skills in model 2 increases the proportion of correctly classified observations 
from  61.86%  to  72.03%.  The  full  model  (model  4)  has  a  correct  prediction  rate  of 
74.77%, clearly superior than the rate than would be obtained by a random prediction 
(51.58%). It is also worthwhile to note that the increase in prediction accuracy is greatest 
from  model  1  to  2,  where  the  recipient  assimilation  capability  variable  is  included. 
Together with the mediocre improvements in the hit rate from models 2 to 3 and 3 to 4 
where  knowledge  heterogeneity  variables  are  entered,  this  suggests  that  the  recipient 
need for supporting skills is primarily responsible for the high predictive precision of our 



















           
Model 1           
Equity  56  30  86     
Contractual  15  17  32     
Total  71  47  118  61.86%  52.07% 
           
Model 2           
Equity  60  22  82     
Contractual  11  25  36     
Total  71  47  118  72.03%  52.07% 
           
Model 3           
Equity  56  18  74     
Contractual  11  29  40     
Total  67  47  114  74.56%  51.54% 
           
Model 4           
Equity  51  15  66     
Contractual  12  29  41     
Total  63  44  107  74.77%  51.58% 
TABLE 2.3 
Estimates of fit of logistic regression models   34     
 
We also look at the improvement in log likelihood from baseline to fuller models. 
The  inclusion  of  the  recipient  need  for  supporting  skills  in  Model  2  results  in  a 
significant improvement in log likelihood over the baseline model (χ
2 with one degree of 
freedom = 10.39, p< 0.01). Also the explained variance – indicated by the McFadden R 
square-- increases substantially from 0.0721 to 0.1376. The coefficients of the control 
variables in model 2 show that prior export increases, while entry into India in the post 
liberalization period decreases, the probability of choosing a joint venture. These effects 
remain in all other models, but vary in their levels of significance. The coefficient of 
recipient need for supporting skills is highly significant (p<0.01) but that of its quadratic 
term is not. The lack of significance of the quadratic term at conventional levels leaves us 
with inadequate support for H1. However, the significant first order term suggests that 
the overall correlation between recipient need for supporting skills and the propensity to 
joint venture is positive.  
We have argued that heterogeneity in the nature of technology transferred to the 
recipient  could  systematically  affect  the  choice  between  joint  venture  and  licensing. 
Model  3  tests  this  hypothesis  by  including  technology  characteristics  –  codifiability, 
patent status, age of the technology and prior transfer history. Compared to model 2, 
there is a significant improvement in log likelihood (χ
2 with four degrees of freedom = 
12.13,  p<  0.01)  and  the  R  squared  statistic  increases  to  0.1929,  suggesting  that 
technology characteristics do have a significant effect on the choice of governance. We 
find  positive  and  significant  coefficients  for  whether  the  technology  was  patented  in 
India and whether know-how had been previously transferred to India, suggesting that 
partners have a higher propensity to choose joint ventures over licensing in those cases.   35     
Both these observed effects are contrary to what we expected in hypotheses 3 and 5. 
Codifiability and age of the technology are not significant. 
Model 4 includes variables denoting the centrality of the transferred technology to 
recipients and transferors. The inclusion of these two variables results in a significant 
improvement in log likelihood over the previous model (χ
2 with two degrees of freedom 
= 11.86, p< 0.01). The coefficients and standard errors suggest that when technology 
transferred is core to the recipient firm there is a significantly higher likelihood that the 
alliance  takes  the  form  of  a  joint  venture.  This  result  corroborates  H7b.  The  results 
further suggest no significant effect of the relative importance of the technology to the 
transferor.    Interestingly,  the  patent  variable  is  no  longer  significant,  suggesting  that 
technology centrality and patent status might be correlated. 
To  ensure  that  our  conclusions  based  on  statistical  significance  of  variable 
coefficients are not trivial or meaningless, we also calculate the marginal effects for each 
independent variable (cf. Shaver, 2006). Calculating effect sizes is also useful given that 
the  coefficients  in  models  one  to  four  do  not  provide  for  easy  interpretation  as  they 
denote effects on log-odds rather than probabilities.  
  Table  2.4  largely  corroborates  the  conclusions  made  above.  Since  the  patent 
variable shows slightly unstable behaviour across model 3 and model 4 in table 3, we 
report effect sizes for each variable using the estimated parameters of both models 3 and 
4. Recipient need for supporting skills, patent, prior transfer of know-how, and centrality 
of  technology  to  recipient  appear  to  have  positive  and  non-negligible  effects  on  the 
probability of the alliance being a joint venture. With the caveat that the variables are 
scaled differently and hence effect sizes may not be truly comparable, prior transfer of 
the  technology  to  India  appears  to  have  by  far  the  largest  impact  on  the  dependent 
variable. Also, though it appears insignificant in model 4, patent status does have a non-  36     
negligible effect size.  Interestingly,  and contrary to our expectations in hypothesis 3, 
patented technologies are more likely to be transferred through equity joint ventures than 
through licensing.  
2.5.1  Further probing the effect of recipient need for supporting skills    
The  lack  of  support  for  our  U-shaped  prediction  of  recipient  capabilities  on 
governance  choice  is  intriguing.  We  sought  to  probe  this  further  to  understand  the 
observed relationship in our data. 
The first order term of recipient need for supporting skills gives us a sense of the 
general  nature  of  the  relationship  (Aiken  &  West,  1991).  The  significant  positive 
coefficient  of  this  term  suggests  that  the  propensity  to  form  equity  alliances  is  an 
increasing function of the recipient need for supporting skills.  
One  plausible  explanation  for  empirically  observing  only  the  upward  sloping 
portion of the hypothesized U-shaped effect is that appropriation concerns which are 
primarily responsible for the downward sloping portion of the U curve do not strongly 
affect governance choice (please see figure 2.2). In other words, in our sample, joint 
ventures  are  preferred  over  licensing  when  effective  technology  transfer  requires  the 
transferor to transfer, beyond the technology itself, a range of tacit supporting skills. In 
that case the greater incentive alignment that characterizes equity transfers (and hence 
equity  joint  ventures)  helps  alleviate  information  asymmetries  and  provides  greater 
incentives to both transferor and recipient to effect the transfer. That this factor primes 
appropriation hazards is not entirely surprising given our context. One would expect the 
cost  of  appropriation  hazards  to  transferors  be  a  function  of  the  severity  of  the 
consequences  of  having  the  recipient  compete  with  them.  This  should  
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Effect  of  changing  independent  variable  by 
one standard deviation or one unit
b 
 
Variables  Model 3  Model 4 
 
Recipient’s need for supporting skills  
 
 




-0.012  0.0045 
 
Patent  0.3031  0.2150 
 
Age of know-how  0.005  -0.015 
 
Prior know-how transfer  0.3886  0.5236 
 
Centrality of know-how to recipient    0.128 
 
Centrality of know-how to source    0.061 
a Continuous variables are held at their mean values and binary variables at their modal 
values 
b  Changes  in  probability  of  JV  following  (a)  for  continuous  variables:  a  one  standard 
deviation change from mean values (b) for binary variables: a change from 0 to 1, holding 
all other continuous variables at their mean and binary variables at their modal values 
 
TABLE 2.4 
Changes in estimated probabilities of dependent variable (JV=1)  
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in  turn  depend  on  the  overlap  in  geographic  markets  between  the  transferor  and  the 
recipient  and  of  the  age  of  the  technology.  In  some  cases  in  our  sample,  licensing 
contracts specifically exclude the possibility of exporting back to the home country of the 
licensor, and the bulk of the technologies transferred in our sample are not cutting edge – 
in 85% of observations, technologies are more than five years old. Hence, managers of 
foreign firms transferring knowledge to India may perceive appropriation hazards to be 
low because they see Indian firms as unlikely competitors in their home and other crucial 
markets.  
 
  The notion that contractual hazards rooted in information asymmetries outweigh 
those based on appropriation concerns is also mirrored in our results for centrality of 
technology to the recipient. If appropriation concerns are the key contractual problems, 
as  we  argue  in  hypothesis  7a,  we  should  observe  a  negative  relationship  between 
centrality of technology to the recipient and the probability of joint venture.  We find, 
however, that when the technology transferred is core to the recipient, JVs are more 
likely  than  licensing  contracts.  This  is  because  in  such  situations  the  recipient  is 
particularly concerned about the sender being untruthful and overstating the value of the 
technology. This in turn accentuates information problems between the buyer and seller 
(Arrow, 1974). A licensing agreement does not alleviate this problem since the sender is 
partly paid upfront for the technology; a joint venture, where both parties’ returns depend 
on the successful implementation of the technology, becomes necessary. The empirical 
results for both recipients need for supporting skills and centrality of technology to the 
recipient thus seem to suggest that the contractual hazards in our sample of alliances are 
driven more by information problems rather than appropriation concerns.  
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2.6  DISCUSSION 
Previous  studies  of  the  governance  of  technology  alliances  have  typically 
underemphasized  variations  across  alliances  in  recipient  capabilities  and  technology 
characteristics. Both these constructs have indeed been examined in the broader context 
of the boundaries of the firm (Kogut & Zander, 1993; Martin & Salomon, 2003), but few 
studies  have  specifically  examined  their  role  in  determining  the  governance  form  in 
alliances.  This  is  what  we  do  in  this  paper  –  we  examine  how  both  technology 
assimilation capability of the recipient and characteristics of the technology influence the 
choice between licensing and joint venture as governance forms for technology alliances. 
Using transaction cost theory, we argue that the contractual hazards that drive this choice 
hinge  on  information  costs  facing  the  technology  buyer  and  on  the  potential  for 
technology  misappropriation  facing  the  technology  transferor.  These  information  and 
appropriation costs in a given alliance, in turn, depend on the technology capability of the 
recipient and on characteristics of the technology being transferred.  
In contrast to much of the transaction cost approach to alliances (Oxley, 1997; 
Sampson, 2004) which has hypothesized that the choice between contracts and equity 
relationships depends on the level of appropriation hazards, we model the choice between 
licensing  and  equity  joint  ventures  as  hinging  on  both  information  costs  and 
appropriation hazards. The traditional argument has been that equity joint ventures are 
preferred over contracts such as licensing whenever transferor and recipients have similar 
technological  capabilities  because  in  that  case  the  consequences  to  the  transferor  of 
knowledge  misappropriation  by  the  recipient  are  severe  (Colombo,  2003;  Sampson, 
2004).  We  argue  that  this  argument  overlooks  the  information  problems  faced  by 
technology buyers (cf. Arrow, 1974; Hennart, 1989) whereby they often find it difficult 
to  assess  ex  ante  the  value  of  the  technology.  One  way  to  alleviate  this  information  
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asymmetry problem is to align the interests of technology transferor and recipient by 
having them become co-owners of the venture, i.e., by having them set up an equity joint 
venture. While the appropriation hazards argument suggests that equity joint ventures 
will be chosen when the technological capabilities of the parties converge, arguments 
based on information and enforcement costs suggest that they will be chosen when they 
diverge. Assuming that both hypotheses are correct, we hypothesize that the relationship 
between the technological capability of the recipient and the propensity to choose equity 
joint ventures over licensing contracts is U-shaped, with equity joint ventures chosen 
when the technological capability of the partners is either very strong or very weak. 
In contrast to the extant literature that has mostly used secondary data, we use a 
survey  instrument  to  better  measure  the  key  variables  that  we  hypothesize  affect  the 
governance  of  alliances.  Proponents  of  the  appropriation  hazards  argument  have 
operationalized the cost of misappropriation by the similarity in the knowledge base of 
the parties which they have measured by the overlap in the patent portfolio of the parties 
(Sampson,  2004).  This  measure  has  some  drawbacks  because  it  is  not  transaction 
specific, since the overall overlap may not always map with the overlap for a specific 
transaction, and because it only measures similarity in patentable skills, thus ignoring 
potential  dissimilarity  in  non-patented  tacit  skills.  By  using  a  survey,  we  are  able  to 
measure the similarity in skills for the specific transaction. We also can measure the 
extent the overlap between transferor and sender in non-patented tacit skills. 
Previous  authors  have  also  measured  the  characteristics  of  the  technology 
transferred by the characteristics of the technology stricto sensu, i.e. without considering 
the set of supporting skills that are required to implement it. Kogut and Zander (1993), 
for  example,  measure  the  characteristics  of  technology  by  asking  transferors.  Yet 
technology recipients are likely to choose the mode of technology transfer based on the  
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effective technology package they need, that is based on the technology stricto sensu plus 
the supporting skills that they need to implement it. Because supporting skills are usually 
tacit, and hence difficult to obtain by contract, technology recipients that need them are 
likely to prefer equity modes of transfer. Hence it is important to take these supporting 
skills into account when assessing the characteristics of the technology. Focusing on 
technology stricto sensu, and not on the effective technology package  needed by the 
recipient, misses a large part of what is relevant in technology transfer. In our survey we 
specifically ask technology recipients to evaluate the extent to which they possess the 
supporting skills needed to implement the technology being accessed.   
Testing our model of the determinants of the choice made between equity joint 
ventures and licensing contracts to organize the transfer of technology between foreign 
and Indian firms, we find no support for our hypothesized U-shaped relationship between 
the Indian partner’s technological capabilities and their propensity to choose equity joint 
ventures over licensing. Instead we find that the Indian partner need for supporting skills 
is a powerful factor that leads both parties to prefer equity joint ventures over licensing. 
Hence, in our case, it is divergence in technological capabilities, not similarity, as found 
in other contexts, that lead to the choice of equity joint ventures to govern the transaction. 
The weak effect of appropriation concerns is perhaps because foreign managers 
perceive Indian firms to be less likely to emerge as powerful competitors in their home 
and other crucial markets. This finding suggests that conceptions of transaction costs 
being  solely  a  function  of  appropriability  hazards  (Sampson,  2004)  have  limited 
generalizability. 
Our results also suggest that multi-theoretical perspectives may be necessary to 
fully understand the alliance governance phenomenon. From a transaction cost standpoint 
we  argued  that  prior  transfers  of  technology  should  make  it  easier  to  transfer  it  
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subsequently through arm’s length contracts. Instead we find in our sample that the fact 
that  the  transferor  has  previously  transferred  the  knowledge  to  India  enhances  the 
probability that it will effect  a subsequent transfer through joint ventures rather than 
licensing. What could be happening is that while such prior transfers make subsequent 
transfers  through  licensing  contracts  relatively  easier  (Teece,  1977;  Davidson  & 
McFetridge, 1985; Kogut & Zander, 1993) they also imply that the foreign firm has had 
prior  first  hand  experience  with  the  economic  and  technological  performance  of  its 
know-how in India. Having overcome initial uncertainty in that regard, foreign firms are 
being more willing to make greater resource commitments. Our findings that firms that 
have had prior exports to India are more likely to choose joint ventures is consistent with 
the  predictions  of  the  Uppsala  internationalisation  model  (Johanson  &  Wiedersheim-
Paul,  1975;  Johanson  &  Vahlne,  1977)  that  firms  follow  an  incremental  process  of 
foreign expansion by which an increase in knowledge of the foreign market is matched 
by  an  increase  in  commitment.  Firms  thus  move  from  low  commitment  (exports, 
licensing) to higher commitment modes (joint ventures and wholly-owned affiliates).  
In conclusion, our research contributes to the alliance governance literature by 
carefully  examining  the  effects  of  technology  characteristics  and  recipient  capability 
simultaneously.  We  also  contribute  to  transaction  cost  theory  by  showing  that  the 
relevant sources of contractual hazards in technology transactions are context dependent. 
In samples from lesser-developed countries such as ours, information costs pose greater 
hazards than appropriation concerns. This finding is consistent with an important body of 
literature on technology transfer (Baranson, 1969; Hennart, 1989).  Finally, this is to the 
best of our knowledge the first transaction-level study to examine the choice between 
contractual  and  equity  alliances in  India.  We  thus  add  to  our  currently  quite  limited  
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knowledge  on  knowledge  transfer  between  foreign  and  local  firms  in  emerging 
economies (Tse et al., 1997; Hagedoorn & Sedaitis, 1998; Meyer, 2001).  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MULTI-MARKET  COMPETITION,  MOMENTUM,  DENSITY  DEPENDENCE, 
AND  ENTRY  DETERRENCE:  SEGMENT  ENTRY  BY  FOREIGN  FIRMS  IN 




Product markets are typically characterized by discontinuities in buyers’ traits and 
preferences. These discontinuities give rise to ‘market segments’ within which buyers are 
relatively similar in their tastes and preferences. Firms entering such segmented product 
markets face non-uniform distributions of buyers and competitors across these segments 
and hence, have differing propensities to enter a given segment at a given point in time. 
In this paper, we investigate the factors that shape the decision of foreign firms to enter 
various product segments in a given industry of a host country. Our dependent variable is 
whether or not a foreign firm enters a given market segment in a particular year. We 
develop predictions from multiple theoretical perspectives – multi-market competition, 
strategic momentum, population ecology and spatial economics – and test them using 
data on market segment entries of foreign assemblers in the US automobile industry over 
a period of nearly two decades (1986 – 2003). Our results suggest support for multi-
market competition, momentum, and spatial competition theories.      
                                                 
3 This paper has benefited immensely from discussions with Jean-Francois Hennart, 
Xavier Martin, and Renata Kosova. I also thank the department of Organization & 
Strategy, Tilburg University for funding the data collection. 
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3.1  INTRODUCTION 
Product  markets  are  rarely  homogeneous  but  more  usually  characterized  by 
discontinuities in buyer preferences. These discontinuities give rise to ‘market segments’ 
which  are  parts  of  the  market  where  buyers  have  relatively  homogeneous  tastes  and 
preferences. External resources that are necessary for firm survival – primarily potential 
buyers, but also other factors of production such as knowledge, suppliers, and so on. – 
are often unevenly distributed across these segments, leaving some more abundant in 
resources  than  others.  Similarly,  current  market  incumbents  are  also  non-uniformly 
distributed in this segmented product space. 
Firms targeting a given product market – both de novo entrants and incumbents 
seeking to diversify within the product market – are confronted with these non-uniform 
distributions of buyers and incumbents, and hence, have differing propensities to enter a 
given segment at a given point in time. For example, Eastman Kodak waited on the 
sidelines until recently while many other players such as Canon and Hewlett-Packard 
expanded much earlier into the digital camera segment of the photography equipment 
market.  
Segment entry decisions are of vital importance because they shape over time the 
market footprint of firms in product space. A firm’s posture in product space has direct 
implications  for  the  volume  of  goods  it  can  sell  and  the  extent  of  competition  from 
incumbent firms it will face. Also, as proponents of the resource partitioning perspective 
in organization ecology have argued, where the firm chooses to locate within a resource 
distribution influences its odds of survival (Baum & Mezias, 1992; Dobrev et.al., 2001; 
Carroll, Dobrev & Swaminathan, 2002). 
Interestingly  though,  we  do  not  seem  to  have  much  knowledge  of  how  firms 
choose which market segments to enter (but see Haveman 1993; Baum & Haveman,  
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1997; Martin & Mitchell, 1998; Greve, 2000) or of what accounts for the variation in 
their propensities to enter a given segment at a given point in time. 
While studying ‘entry’, however, one issue that needs to be clarified is the ‘risk 
set’ – the set of firms that are considered potential entrants or at ‘risk’ of entry. Defining 
the  risk  set  haphazardly  can  mix  up  different  managerial  decision  processes.  For 
example,  not  separating  new  firms  (de  novo)  entering  a  segment  from  diversifying 
incumbents (de alio) can potentially conflate organizational founding and segment entry 
decisions because, for de novo firms, founding of the firm and entry into a segment occur 
simultaneously. That is, the decision to enter a segment for these firms is embedded in 
the decision to start up. Consequently, the cost of entering a segment in a given year is 
not the same for de novo and de alio firms – new firms face costs of both starting up as 
well as entering a market segment, while incumbents have already incurred the fixed 
costs of starting up. The decision of which segment to enter in a  given year is thus 
characteristically different – and needs to be treated separately – between these two sets 
of firms. One approach to this problem is to remove all new firms and define the risk set 
as existing incumbents seeking to diversify into other market segments (cf. Haveman & 
Nonnemaker 2000: 242). Alternatively, one could geographically separate the founding 
and segment entry processes by defining the risk set as foreign firms in a given host 
country. In this case, the (foreign) firms at risk are founded elsewhere but are still at risk 
of entry into various segments of the host country market. Their founding and segment 
entry decisions are less likely to be intertwined.  
In  this  paper,  we  adopt  the  second  approach  and  study  the  segment  entry 
decisions  of  foreign  manufacturers  in  the  US  automobile  industry  over  nearly  two 
decades (1986 - 2003). Our dependent variable is whether or not a foreign manufacturer i 
entered segment j in a  given  year,  and we  argue that multiple perspectives can lend  
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themselves to understanding this decision. Drawing from strategic management, strategic 
momentum,  population  ecology  and  spatial  economics/industrial  organization 
perspectives, our hypotheses predict that a firm’s propensity to enter a given segment 
depends on the extent of its multi-market contact with rivals and on its prior experience 
in  that  segment,  on  segment  density,  and  on  the  extent  of  entry  barriers  and  spatial 
competition in the segment.  
Our  results  show  that  a  foreign  car  manufacturer’s  decision  to  enter  a  given 
market segment is significantly influenced by the extent of multi-market contact it has 
with incumbents in the segment, as well as by its prior entry experience and the number 
of  other  participants  in  the  segment.  Multi-market  competition  and  the  firm’s  prior 
entries into a segment have non-monotonic effects; we find that prior entry has a positive 
but diminishing effect on segment entry while that of multi-market competition follows 
an inverted U-shaped pattern, increasing initially and then decreasing after a point. The 
number of other participants in the segment –its density – has a negative, deterring effect 
on the propensity to enter. We interpret these results as corroboration for multi-market 
competition, strategic momentum and spatial competition predictions. Support for the 
population ecology perspective, which predicts an inverted-U effect for segment density, 
is limited. 
  This paper makes significant contributions with respect to both dependent and 
independent variables. There have been a few studies of segment-entry, but these differ 
from ours either in the way segments or the risk set are defined. For example, Greve 
(2000)  studies  niche-entry  in  the  Tokyo  banking  industry,  but  defines  a  niche  as  a 
particular geographic location, in his case a county or a ward in Tokyo. So essentially, 
his is a study on how managers choose where to locate when setting up a new bank 
branch. Haveman (1993) and Martin & Mitchell (1998), on the other hand, define, as we  
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do, niches based on discontinuities in the product market, but their risk sets consist of all 
incumbents and not only foreign firms.  
  On the independent variables side, we use multiple theoretical perspectives to 
predict segment-entry. This is innovative, given that most of these perspectives have not 
been employed at the market-segment level of analysis. Given this, our study explores 
whether the theoretical mechanisms suggested by these perspectives can explain firm 
behavior at the segment level. Furthermore, each perspective holds specific assumptions 
about managerial action and decision-making, and strikingly differs from the others in 
predictive content. Given this theoretical rivalry, our hypotheses tests serve as a contest 
between competing theoretical priors and predictors for explaining variance in segment-
entry propensities.  
 
3.2  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Several theoretical perspectives can potentially explain segment entries (Greve, 
2000).  Both  industrial  organization  theorists  and  population  ecologists  have  studied 
distributions of firm entries. While the former typically examine variations in entry rates 
in a cross section of industries (Caves & Porter, 1977) and how they are influenced by 
entry barriers (Bain, 1956), the latter are concerned with rates of entry in populations of 
firms  in  an  industry  over  time  (Hannan  and  Freeman,  1977;  1989).  Both  these 
perspectives, hence,  could be brought to explain variations in segment-entry  as well. 
Spatial economics which initially studied the pricing and location behavior of firms in 
geographic space (Hotelling, 1929) and later on in product space (Prescott & Vischer, 
1977; Schmalensee, 1978; Stavins, 1995), is another useful lens to study where foreign 
entrants locate in product space. The Behavioral perspective which proposes a set of 
theories to understand decision-making under uncertainty (e.g. experiential learning and  
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strategic  momentum)  is  yet  another  potential  way  to  approach  the  question  of  how 
managers of foreign firms make niche entry decisions. This is particularly so because 
such decisions are typically made in the face of uncertainty about their outcomes (Greve, 
2000). Finally, from a ‘strategic management’ perspective, proponents of multi- market 
competition and mutual forbearance theories suggest that a firm’s competitive context 
will influence its behavior (Gimeno & Woo, 1999; Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000). 
From this perspective, segment entry can be approached as one such strategic behavior 
taken in response to change in a firm’s strategic interdependencies with rivals across 
multiple markets.  
The  above  four  perspectives  and  related  theories  have  different  underlying 
assumptions  and  predictive  content,  and  generate  contradictory  predictions  in  some 
cases, making testing them against each other particularly interesting and valuable.  
For example, the theories listed above differ in the assumptions they make about 
the relevant time frame managers consider when making decisions (Greve, 2000), and 
the role of managerial action in firm behavior and survival. 
Momentum theory suggests that what firms do is largely determined by what they 
have successfully done in the past, as they tend to repeat routines developed through past 
actions  (Amburgey  &  Miner,  1992).  For  example,  firms  that  have  repeatedly  made 
acquisitions  are  more  likely  to  acquire  in  the  future  as  well  (Haleblian,  Kim  & 
Rajagopalan,  2006).  Mutual  forbearance  theory,  on  the  other  hand,  argues  that  the 
potential for future action or retaliation by rivals is what matters – managers will shape 
their current behavior in a way that insures against future aggressive reaction from rivals. 
In this sense, while momentum theory emphasizes the past, mutual forbearance theory 
focuses on the future as the relevant time-frame for managerial decisions.  
  51     
Theories  also  differ  in  the  role  they  ascribe  to  managerial  action.  Density 
dependence  theorists  from  the  population  ecology  perspective  largely  assume 
environmental  determinism;  founding  into  a  population  is  a  selection  process  and 
managers  can  do  little  to  increase  their  chances  of  being  selected  by  adapting  to 
environments.  Momentum  and  mutual  forbearance,  on  the  other  hand,  are  more 
managerial action – based theories. 
The  theories  we  contrast  in  this  paper  also  differ  with  respect  to  predictive 
content, i.e., the factors they consider most relevant to explaining firm behavior. The 
concept of density dependence in population ecology, and to some extent, the industrial 
organization notions of entry barriers and entry deterrence by incumbents, emphasize the 
role of the firm’s target environment. The number of organizations in the target market, 
the  key  independent  variable  in  density  dependence  theory,  is  argued  to  shape 
opportunities and constraints for potential entrants. Industrial organization theories are 
similar to the extent that they also highlight the role of industry structure - sunk costs, 
barriers and deterrents to entry – in shaping a market’s attractiveness to future entrants. 
Strategic  momentum  and  learning  theories,  however,  emphasize  the  firm’s  past 
experience  and  historical  behavior  more  than  environmental  conditions.  Multi-market 
competition  and  mutual  forbearance  theories  highlight  yet  another  determinant:  the 
extent of multi-market contact between firms, which they argue shapes the propensity of 
firms  to  engage  in  aggressive  strategic  behaviors  such  as  entering  a  new  market 
(Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000; Stephan & Boeker, 2001). 
Predictions  from  these  perspectives  are  not  only  different  but  also  sometimes 
contradictory. Density dependence and industrial organization approaches make differing 
predictions as to how initial incumbent densities affect the attractiveness of a market. 
Density dependence theorists attribute a legitimating or ‘signalling’ role to initial entries  
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in the niche. These first few entries, they argue, signal the presence and viability of the 
niche and hence attract new entrants. Industrial organization theory, on the other hand, 
suggests that early incumbents, if they are few in numbers, will be able to collude to 
deter entry so as to protect their above normal monopoly or oligopoly profits. Hence low 
density of firms in a niche deters future entry.  
A  similar  set  of  opposing  predictions  follows  from  momentum  and  mutual 
forbearance theories (Greve, 2000). While the former suggests that experiences gained in 
a particular market segment induces firms to stick to segments in the immediate vicinity 
of  their  past  entries,  mutual  forbearance  theory  suggests  that  future  rivalry  is  best 
deterred when firms adopt multiple market contacts with rival firms. Thus, while learning 
and momentum theories seem to suggest “focus” in market positions, mutual forbearance 
suggests “spread”. 
To summarize, while a number of perspectives help us understand the segment 
entry decisions of firms, they highlight different determinants, are based on different 
underlying assumptions, and sometimes proffer opposing predictions. Developing and 
testing hypotheses from such alternative approaches, while theoretically interesting, also 
offers several empirical benefits, such as the ability to test for the relative explanatory 
power of different theories in a given setting. This is something single-theory studies 
cannot do. Also, we are able to rigorously test for hypothesized effects while controlling 
for other theoretical influences in a much better way. 
  Table  3.1  summarizes  the  perspectives,  corresponding  theories,  and  key 
predictors that we test in this paper. 
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3.3  HYPOTHESES 
3.3.1  Multi-market contact, mutual forbearance and segment entry  
Multi-market competition scholars argue that a firm’s interdependence with its 
competitors  in  terms  of  the  number  of  markets  jointly  contested  influences  its 
competitive  and  strategic  behavior.  They  have  studied  the  effect  of  multi-market 
competition on various dependent variables such as prices (Gimeno & Woo, 1999), exit 
(Boeker et.al., 1997) and to a lesser extent, entry into markets (Baum & Korn, 1996; 
Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000). While studies on multi-market competition and entry 
have looked primarily at entry into geographic markets, the theoretical argument can be 





Summary of perspectives, theories and key predictors 
 




Strategic Management   Multi-market competition, 
Mutual forbearance 
Extent of multi-market 
competition with incumbents 
in a given market segment 
 
 
Behavioral  Strategic momentum, 
experience 
Number of prior entries into 
a given segment 
 
 
Population ecology  Density dependence theory  Segment density – the 




Industrial organization / 
Spatial economics 
Entry deterrence, spatial 
competition 
Segment density – the 
number of participants in the 
segment  
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The key multi-market competition argument is that contact with competitors in 
multiple as opposed to single markets can serve as a deterrent to rivalrous actions by 
firms. Rivalry between firms that meet each other in a single market is limited to just that 
one common market. Any retaliation by a single-market rival to aggressive behavior by 
the focal firm will be confined to only that shared market. On the other hand, when firms 
jointly contest each other in multiple markets, an aggressive action in one market could 
lead to retaliation against the aggressor in any or all of the other common markets as 
well. The huge cost of this potential large-scale multi-market retaliation, especially in 
those markets where the aggressor is most vulnerable, will lead firms with multi-market 
contact to refrain from aggressive behavior against each other. Scholars call this ‘mutual 
forbearance’. 
When applied to behavior such as entry into markets, however, this tendency for 
mutual forbearance cannot be assumed to be uniformly active across all levels of multi-
market contact. In fact, recent studies (Baum & Korn 1999; Haveman & Nonnemaker, 
2000; Stephan & Boeker, 2001) have added a caveat to the above mutual forbearance 
argument  and  propose  an  inverted  U-shape  relationship  between  the  extent  of  multi-
market contact a firm has in a target market and its propensity to enter that market. At 
relatively low levels of multi-market contact, they argue, the primary motivation of the 
focal firm will be to create more contact points in order to have an effective deterrent 
against any future aggressive behavior by its competitors. That is, when current points of 
contact are low, firms may in fact be motivated to expand the scope of their interaction 
with rivals by entering other markets where the rivals are already present. This expansion 
could  also  be  driven  by  the  desire  to  learn  about  rivals’  strategies  and  behavior  in 
different markets. Furthermore, because of low multi-market contact, firms do not see  
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themselves as huge threats to each other in other markets and so, mutual forbearance 
does not yet set in. On the other hand, at very high levels of multi market contact, firm 
jointly  contest  a  large  number  of  common  markets  and  correspondingly  there  is 
considerable overlap in their market footprints. With such overlap, the fear of potential 
retaliation  by  incumbent  firms  sets  in  and  deters  the  focal  firm  from  performing  an 
aggressive act such as market entry. In our case, we are looking at entry into different 
segments of the US automobile industry, so “multi-market’ refers specifically to ‘multi-
segment’.  
Hence from a multi-market competition point of view: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the extent of multi 
segment contact a firm has with its rivals in a segment and its propensity to enter that 
segment. That is, the probability of entry into a segment increases and then decreases 
with the extent of multi-segment competition a firm faces with rivals in that segment. 
 
3.3.2  Prior experience, momentum and entry propensity 
 
Past strategic behavior can be argued to have two types of impact on firms and 
their future behavior. First, as research from a ‘momentum’ perspective (Amburgey & 
Miner,  1992;  Martin  &  Park,  2004)  suggests,  past  adoption  of  a  particular  strategic 
behavior can lead to repeating what the firm has done in the past and hence to inertia 
against  adopting  a  different  strategy.  The  key  argument  is  that  experience  with  a 
particular routine or strategy causes firms to get better at it and hence to specialize in it 
(Levitt & March, 1988:322). If firms can be seen as executing routines (Cyert & March, 
1963), then as they repeat the same routines over and over again they tend to get better at 
them. As they get better, the routines start to deliver favorable performance outcomes.  
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This  positive  feedback  again  reinforces  the  repeated  use  of  the  routine.  Negative 
outcomes do not necessarily cause the abandonment of the routine since managers tend to 
attribute the failure not to the routine but to flaws in the way it was executed (Amburgey 
& Miner, 1992). In short, organizations tend to repeat strategies because they become 
better at executing them. Amburgey & Miner (1992) find evidence for such repeated 
momentum in merger activity. 
Second, experience with a task is also uncertainty reducing (Henisz & Delios, 
2001). When particular strategies are repeated, managers become more familiar with the 
different possible outcomes and with ways to enhance the odds of the favorable ones. 
Behavioral theory suggests that managers tend to avoid confrontation with uncertainty 
and search for solutions in the vicinity of their past experiences. If this is true, we should 
observe managers sticking to paths similar to those defined by their past actions and 
staying away from more unfamiliar strategies and routines. They will stick close to those 
market segments which they have entered and in which they have previously operated. 
The  notion  of  managers’  predilection  for  uncertainty  avoidance  underlies 
international  business  theories  of  international  expansion  such  as  the  Uppsala  stages 
model.  This  model  suggests  that  managers  of  internationalizing  firms  minimize  the 
uncertainty they have to face by expanding first into similar countries and by adopting 
modes of entry that entail low commitment. In a separate study on the choice of location 
for  foreign  manufacturing  plants  and  the  role  of  prior  location  experiences  in  that 
decision, Delios & Henisz (2003) find that prior experience with politically hazardous 
countries reduces the negative effect of political hazard on entry. Past experience with 
politically stable countries, on the other hand, increases the negative effect of a country’s 
political hazard on entry. These results from the international business literature further 
support  the  notion  that  when  faced  with  complex  decisions  such  as  those  related  to  
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market entry, managers tend to avoid uncertainty and minimize the extent of unfamiliar 
information with which they need to contend. They do this by limiting their expansion to 
familiar settings.  
  Applying strategic momentum and uncertainty avoidance arguments to entry into 
market segments, we expect managers to repeat past entry behavior and to shun entering 
new segments. It is useful to note that unlike entry into a population of firms in a home 
country (i.e., ‘organizational founding’) or in new country markets (i.e., expansion into a 
given foreign market), entry into market segments can be repeated. That is, firms can re-
enter  market  segments  either  with  new  or  updated  products  to  replace  their  existing 
product line in the segment, or, when the market segment is large enough, to be sold 
alongside their existing product.     
  However, while we may expect a ‘momentum effect’ in segment entry where 
firms with prior experience in a segment are on average more likely than other firms to 
enter the segment again in a given year, it is unlikely that this effect will be monotonic 
(e.g. Martin & Park, 2004). As with experience with most tasks, the marginal effect of 
each additional repetition on subsequent segment entry will decrease, rather than remain 
constant. This is because at higher levels of familiarity with a specific task, it is less 
likely that an additional occurrence will generate substantially new insights or learning 
about the task. Also, old experience may become less useful over time. In other words, 
any momentum effect in segment entry is likely to dissipate gradually (Argote, 1999). 
Hence:  
Hypothesis 2: A firm’s propensity to enter a segment at a given time increases, but at a 
decreasing rate, with its number of prior entries in that segment  
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3.3.3  Density dependence and segment entry 
   The  notion  of  density  dependence  has  been  traditionally  used  by  population 
ecologists  to  study  entry  and  exit  (i.e.,  organizational  founding  and  mortality)  in 
populations of organizations (see Amburgey & Rao, 1996 for a review). The argument is 
that temporal variation in the rates of entry and exit into an environment can be at least 
partially explained by the density of organizations in that environment. At lower levels of 
densities, increases in the number of organizations tend to legitimize the organizational 
form by giving it a “taken for granted” status (Meyer & Rowan 1977; Hannan & Carroll, 
1992). A given environment has, however, a finite “carrying capacity”, in other words 
there is a upper limit to the number of organizations that it can support with its resources; 
hence, after a threshold, competition for resources forces a decline in the rate of entries. 
 While the original ‘founding’ model was developed to explain rates of entry into 
populations  (for  example  in  the  Dutch  accounting  industry),  it  can  also,  with  two 
modifications, be used to model entry into product segments. The first modification is 
with respect to the phenomenon the model is intended to explain. The original model 
explains  the  entry  of  previously  non-existent  firms  into  a  population  (this  is  termed 
‘organizational  founding’).  Every  population  of  business  firms,  however,  is  also 
distributed across a product space. While being similar to foundings to the extent that 
they  also  are  ‘entries’,  segment  entry  decisions  are  about  where  to  locate,  or  which 
particular location to enter in this product space. In many cases a firm’s entry into the 
population overlaps with its first segment entry(ies), but this need not always be the case. 
In instances where firms are incorporated but have a gestation period before launching 
their first product (every product is launched to cater to a segment and represents the 
firm’s  entry  into  that  segment),  ‘founding’  (entry  into  the  population)  and  ‘segment  
  59     
entry’ are distinct. Also, while an organization can be founded only once, segment entry, 
either into the same or different segments, can be repeated. Despite these differences, 
however, we think density dependence theory can be fruitfully employed to understand 
entries into segments because the theory is essentially about how the structure of the 
target environment – the population or the market segment - makes it either attractive or 
unattractive for entry.  
The  second  modification that  we  need  to  make  to  the  original  version  of the 
density dependence model is on the level at which the dependent variable is measured. 
Organizational ecologists typically count “entry rates”, the number of new firms in a 
population in a given year. This dependent variable is (i) defined and measured at the 
population level and (ii) varies temporally. To understand how individual firms make 
segment  entry  decisions,  we  need  to  define  our  dependent  variable  as  the  individual 
propensities to enter a given segment. Clearly, the level of analysis here is no longer the 
population,  but  the  firm,  and  more  precisely,  the  firm-segment.  The  variation  in  the 
dependent variable defined this way is both cross-sectional and temporal. The segment 
entry  propensities  vary  across  firms  and  segments,  and  for  each  firm-segment 
combination, across time.  
To summarize the two points above, while organizational ecologists primarily use 
the  density  dependence  model  to  explain  temporal  variation  in  founding  rates  in 
populations of organizations, in this paper we use the model to explain cross-sectional 
and temporal variation in individual firms’ propensities to enter a given market segment.  
 
Density dependence theory of segment entry 
The density dependence hypothesis suggests that the propensity of firms to enter 
a given market segment depends on the number of other participants already present  
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there.  Firms  are  assumed  to  be  boundedly  rational  and  to  have  limited  abilities  to 
evaluate all possible entry alternatives. Firms at first may not even be aware of an open 
segment in the market, and even when they are, may not be fully aware of the potential 
for entry or availability of resources therein. The first entrants, however, progressively 
signal the viability of the segment and in this sense, legitimize entry into it. Potential 
entrants are then less uncertain about the potential of the segment and hence more likely 
to enter. 
However  resources  are  finite  and  every  environment  has  a  limited  carrying 
capacity  (Hannan  &  Carroll,  1992).  While  initial  entries  signify  the  viability  of  a 
segment, the marginal legitimating effect from an additional entry is likely to diminish as 
more and more entrants enter. After a threshold, larger densities are likely to convey a 
signal that the niche is crowded. Also competition for the limited resources is likely to 
increase with the number of incumbents. This will reduce the probability a firm will enter 
that segment. Hence, 
Hypothesis  3:  There  will  be  an  inverted  U-shaped  relationship  between  a  firm’s 
propensity to enter a given product segment and the density of that segment. 
 
3.3.4  Spatial competition, entry deterrence and segment entry propensity 
 
Spatial competition scholars argue that rivalry among firms is largely localized. 
That is, assuming that firms offer products that can be represented on various points on a 
line which summarizes their characteristics, individual products compete the most with 
those in their neighborhood (Schmalensee, 1978:309). In other words, firms and brands 
near each other, both in a geographic and product space sense, compete more intensely 
than those that are far apart (Greve, 2002).  Taking this into consideration, Prescott & 
Visscher (1977) argue that firms that enter sequentially tend to locate far away from  
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neighbors: “firms do not try to imitate an existing product, but rather aim for the “gaps” 
in the existing product spectrum” (Prescott & Visscher, 1977:380). The number of open 
gaps and thus profitable product locations, however, will be a negative function of the 
number of past entries (Greve, 2002). When there are fewer existing products in the 
market,  there  are  more  potentially  viable  open  spaces  and  vice-versa.  This  line  of 
argument suggests that there is a negative correlation between segment density and future 
entry propensity. To some extent, this prediction from spatial economics overlaps with 
that of density dependence theory, but only at the higher ranges of segment density. From 
a spatial competition point of view, there is little reason to expect, as density dependence 
theory does, a positive relationship between density and entry at lower levels of segment 
density. The industrial  organization literature on market structure suggests alternative 
predictions  for  density  effects  at  the  lower  range  of  segment  density.  Industrial 
organization theorists studying entry have emphasized the notion of entry barriers (Bain, 
1956)  and  entry  deterrence  strategies  by  incumbents  (Spence,  1977;  Dixit,  1980; 
Kessides,  1990).  The  key  insight  here  is  that  incumbents  enjoying  monopolistic  or 
oligopolistic profits have incentives to sustain these profits in the long term by deterring 
entry by new firms. Entry deterrence mechanisms can take different forms. Bain (1956) 
suggested that incumbents may engage in limit pricing – charging lower that the full 
monopoly price – in order to limit the attractiveness of the market for potential entrants. 
It has also been shown that firms can deter entry by committing resources to excess 
production capacity. These investments signal the incumbent’s commitment to increase 
production in the event of an entry so that the threat of a price war is credible (Spence 
1977).  Other  ways  by  which  incumbents  can  signal  a  defensive  intent  are  through 
strategic investments in learning, R&D and advertising (Fundenberg & Tirole 1984) and 
by brand proliferation to fill up product space to leave few profitable niches for potential  
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entrants (Schmalensee 1978, Stavins 1995). While these arguments primarily apply to 
entry into an industry, they can also be brought to bear on entry into industry market 
segments (Caves & Porter 1977). 
The collective propensity for entry deterrence behavior in a market segment is 
likely  to  be  higher  when  there  are  fewer  participants  or  when  the  market  is  highly 
concentrated.  This  is  because,  with  small  numbers  and  relative  price  inelasticity, 
incumbents are more price-makers than takers and enjoy abnormal profits. New entry 
into the segment might lower prices and hence profit margins. Also, when there are fewer 
participants and product offerings, it is more likely that incumbents can benefit from 
economies of scale in production than if there were multiple products in the market. 
Furthermore, with fewer numbers, collusion is easier because there is less likelihood for 
free riding, which is the spillover of deterrence benefits to incumbents who have not put 
in the deterring effort (Olson, 1965). All these reasons, we argue, should motivate the 
existing few incumbents to deter future entry.  
  Hence,  contrary  to  the  density  dependence  notion  in  population  ecology,  the 
industrial organization view suggests that incumbents, when they are few, are more likely 
to set up entry deterrence mechanisms which make entry less attractive. As the number of 
incumbents increase, the propensity and ability to co-ordinate and erect effective entry 
barriers does diminish. But the spatial competition forces explained above which results 
in fewer viable open spaces in the segment ensure that entry is still discouraged. As a 
result, putting industrial organization and spatial competition arguments together, there is 
very little reason to expect that a potential entrant’s propensity to enter a segment will 
increase and then decrease with a rise in segment density. Instead: 
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between a firm’s propensity to enter a 
given product segment and the density of that segment.  
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3.4  DATA & METHODS 
3.4.1  Setting 
 
We  test  these  hypotheses  using  data  on  entries  of  foreign  manufacturers  into 
segments in the  US automobile industry between 1986  and 2003. We define foreign 
manufacturers as firms based outside the US but selling at least one car line in the US 
market. By focusing on a single host country and industry we are able to keep industry 
and  host  country  influences  constant.  By  focusing  on  foreign  rather  than  domestic 
manufacturers  we  are  able  to  ensure  that  organizational  founding  and  entry  into  the 
segment are not intertwined. More than 90% of foreign manufacturers in our sample had 
already entered the US market by 1986 and hence, to a very large extent, we were also 
able to empirically separate (foreign) market entry and segment entry. 
The US automobile market is an excellent setting to test our hypotheses. The 
industry includes a good number of active foreign manufacturers. There were twenty two 
foreign manufacturers present in 1987, though this number fell down to fifteen by 2003. 
The mean market share of these foreign manufacturers was 45%, varying from 35% in 
1986 to 64% in 2003.  
Segments  are  also  relatively  well-defined  in  this  industry.    As  we  have  seen 
earlier, segments are confluences of buyer demand that can sustain a particular product 
type.  Market  segmentation  relies  on  the  basic  premise  that  customers  are  not 
homogeneous and have differing preferences about the set of attributes they desire in 
their purchases. These preferences are distributed across a number of dimensions relevant 
to  the  purchase.  For  example,  newspaper  buyers  differ  along  dimensions  like  age, 
education, political affiliation and location of residence (Carrol, Dobrev & Swaminathan 
2002). Each combination of values on each dimension which has a feasible customer  
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population comprises a market segment (e.g. young, educated, republican New Yorkers 
in the case of newspapers). 
In the car industry, the key dimensions along which buyer preferences vary are 
body  type,  car  size,  and  price.  Along  the  body  type  dimension  customers  are 
differentiated  into  those  that  prefer  the  ‘coupe’,  ‘sedan’,  ‘hatchback’,  ‘cross-utility’, 
‘sport-utility’, ‘vans’ or ‘pickup’ body types. Along the size dimension, preferences fall 
under ‘small’, ‘middle’ or ‘large’ and, on the price dimension, under ‘lower’, ‘upper’ or 
‘luxury’. Different combinations of body type, size and price give rise to confluences of 
preferences, such as ‘upper middle sport utility’, ‘luxury large cross-utility’ and so on, 
that are different enough from one another that a single product will not simultaneously 
satisfy buyers in two separate segments. In the automobile industry, buyer preferences 
are quite heterogeneous and this makes the market segments relatively easy to identify.  
The third reason why the auto industry serves as an appropriate setting is because 
it offers considerable variation on our theoretical variables. For example, the industry 
comprises both specialist and generalist types of manufacturers. Specialists (e.g. Ferrari) 
focus solely on specific segments of the product space, catering only to specific types of 
customers,  while  generalists  (e.g.  General  Motors)  straddle  multiple  segments  with a 
more diversified product range.  This heterogeneity in segment focus translates into a 
wide range of multi-market contact in the industry. That is, specialist firms, competing 
only in one or few product segments will tend to have low multi-market contact with 
competitors while the generalists compete in different product segments and have higher 
levels of multi-market contact. This type of variation is crucial to testing our hypotheses, 
in this particular case, the one with multi-market competition as predictor.  
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3.4.2  Segment entry in the automobile industry 
 
The  product  portfolios  of  automobile  manufacturers  are  made  up  of  ‘makes’, 
‘lines’ and ‘cars’ (White, 1971:5). Each manufacturer produces and sells one or more 
‘makes’. Makes usually involves a separate design and production organization within 
the  company,  separate  advertising  campaigns,  separate  dealer  organizations  and 
separately designed car lines or series. These are broken down further into ‘models’ or 
‘cars’. For example, Honda sells cars in the US under two different ‘makes’ – Acura and 
Honda. The Acura make consists further of several ‘lines’ – e.g., Acura Integra, Acura 
NSX and Acura RSX. Each line may come in several variants, which we call ‘models’ or 
‘cars’; for example, the Integra was available in Integra-RS, Integra-LS and Integra-GS 
models while the Acura NSX came in NSX 3.0 and NSX 3.2 variations. Figures 3.1 and 
3.2  provide  examples  of  makes,  lines  and  models  for  Honda  and  Volkswagen,  two 
foreign assemblers in the US. 
  Given  this  multi-tiered  product  structure,  it  is  important  to  carefully  consider 
what does and what doesn’t constitute ‘entry’ into a segment. Whereas at the conceptual 
level, our dependent variable - whether a foreign firm entered a given segment in a given 
year or not – is straightforward, at the empirical level there are at least three ways we can 
define segment entry: as the launch of (a) a new ‘make’, (b) a new ‘line’ or (c) a new ‘car 
/ model’ by a firm into a segment. These three ways of coding entry increase in the level 
of detail and disaggregation as we move from the first to the third, i.e., from entry with 
‘makes’ to entry with ‘models’. In the first case we would code Honda’s launch of the 
Acura make as an entry into the luxury sport segment. In the second, we would consider 
its introduction of the Acura Integra or Acura NSX lines as an entry into that segment; 
and in the third case, we would code the launch of the Acura Integra RS model as an  
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entry. The ‘make’ level is probably too aggregated and is likely to obscure a good deal of 
the dynamics of entry in the industry. Counting ‘cars’ or ‘models’, on the other hand, 
may give rise to spurious entry observations because differences between ‘models’ are 
generally  minor.  For  example,  the  difference  between  the  Z3  1.9  and  Z3  2.8,  two 
‘models’ sold in the luxury sports segment under BMW’s Z3 line, is mainly in engine 
size  and  not  much  else.  Likewise  the  difference  between  the  850  Ci,  which  BMW 
launched in the luxury specialty segment in 1993, and the 850i which it introduced three 
years earlier consists only in the addition of dual air bags and a fold down rear seat 
(Covello, 2002: 159). It is clearly erroneous to count the launch of the Z3 2.8 model in 
the luxury sport segment or the 850 Ci in the luxury specialty  segment as  an entry. 
Hence,  given  that  ‘makes’  under-count,  and  ‘cars’  over-count  legitimate  entries  into 
segments, we coded our entries at the ‘line’ level. That is, we only considered the launch 
of a new ‘line’ into a segment, and not the introduction of new ‘makes’ or ‘models / 
cars’, as an entry. For example, while we considered the launch of the BMW Z3 in 1996 
in the luxury sport segment as an entry, we did not count the addition of specific models, 
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3.4.3    Sample 
 
In line with our research question and  focus we defined our  “risk set” as the 
population of foreign automobile manufacturers in the US. Accordingly, the first step in 
putting together our sample was to identify which foreign firms were selling cars in the 
US market each year from 1986 to 2003. We did not restrict the sample only to firms that 
had assembling plants in the US (e.g. Honda) but also included firms that imported their 
fully or partly assembled cars from off-shore plants into the US (e.g. Porsche). While our 
risk set consists solely of foreign assemblers, some of our independent variables such as 
segment density – how many incumbents were in a given segment - do not distinguish 
between foreign and US firms. Hence we also collected data on domestic assemblers 
during this period.  
Next,  we  relied  on  Ward’s  Automotive  Yearbook  to  provide  us  with  the 
segmentation of the market for each year. Ward’s segmentation is based on consumer 
preferences  for  body  style,  size,  and  price.  Over  time,  and  as  product  markets  have 
matured,  buyer  preferences  have  become  more  sophisticated  and  variegated. 
Accordingly, the number of segments in the industry has also varied over time. From 
1986 until 1994, Ward’s Automotive Yearbook listed twenty-three segments, between 
1995 and 1999, twenty-four, and between 2000 and 2003, twenty-six. The rise in the 
number of segments indicates the emergence of new classes of consumers. For example, 
the two new segments in 2000 are a result of the rise of a group of consumers preferring 
mid-sized cross-utility and luxury cross-utility vehicles.  The concept of the cross-utility 
car wasn’t common until then. Table 3.2 provides a list of all segments in our data.  
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TABLE 3.2 
List of segments in the auto industry  
 
 




Daewoo Lanos, Kia Rio, Toyota Echo, Chevrolet Metro 
 
Upper Small  Daewoo Nubira, Dodge Neon, VW Golf 
 
Small Speciality  Toyota Celica, VW Beetle 
   
Lower Middle  Daewoo Leganza, VW Jetta, Chevrolet Malibu 
 
Upper Middle  Acura Integra, Chrysler Sebring, Nissan Maxima 
 
Middle Speciality  Mitsubishi Eclipse, Ford Mustang 
Large  Chrysler Concorde, Buick LeSabre 
   
Lower Luxury  Audi A4, BMW 3 series, Lexus IS 300 
 
Middle Luxury  Audi A6, BMW 5-series, Cadillac DeVille 
 
Upper Luxury  Audi A8, Lexus LS 430 
 
Luxury Sport  Acura NSX, BMW Z3, Chevrolet Corvette, Honda S2000 
 
Luxury Speciality  Cadillac Eldorado, Mercedes Benz CLK 
   
Small Sport Utility  Jeep Wrangler, Kia Sportage, Suzuki Vitara 
 
Middle Sport Utility  GMC Jimmy S, Nissan Pathfinder 
 
Large Sport Utility  Chevrolet Suburban, Toyota Sequoia, Dodge Durango 
 
Luxury Middle Sport Utility  Landrover Discovery, Range rover, Mercedes M-class 
 
Luxury Large Sport Utility  Lexus LX 470, Toyota Landcruiser 
   
Small Cross Utility  Toyota Rav4, Chrysler PT cruiser 
 
Middle Cross Utility  Honda CRV, Hyundai Santa Fe, Mazda Tribute 
 
Middle Luxury Cross Utility  BMW X5, Lexus RX 300, Acura MDX 
   
Small Van  Chevrolet Astro, Honda Odyssey, Plymouth Voyager 
 
Large Van  Dodge Ram van, GMC Savanna 
 
Luxury Van  Mazda MPV, Oldsmobile Silhouette 
   
Small Pickup  Toyota Tacoma, GMC Sonoma 
Large Pickup  Toyota Tundra, GMC Sierra pick-up 
   
Commercial Chassis  Chevrolet P model, Isuzu NPR, Chevy Tiltmaster 
 
Source: Wards Automotive Yearbook 2001  
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Having compiled lists of foreign and domestic manufacturers in the US as well as 
market segments over the observation window, we then put together a list of all car lines 
sold in the US by all these manufacturers for each year in our sample. We also collected 
segment, make and manufacturer identification information on each of these car lines 
from Ward’s Automotive Yearbook and reconfirmed this information using the Standard 
Catalogue of American cars (Gunnell, 2002) and the Standard Catalogue of Imported 
cars (Covello, 2002).  
The  segment  identification  for  each  ‘line’  allowed  us  to  track  segment 
compositions over time. That is, for each year, we could construct listings of ‘lines’ that 
belonged under each segment. Also, by following these segments over the years, we were 
able to flag the appearances of new lines in the segment. When a new line was seen to 
appear in a segment in a given  year, it was coded as an ‘entry’. For example, when 
Honda’s S2000 line appeared for the first time in the luxury sport segment in 1999 we 
coded that as an entry. Since we had information to link lines to ‘makes’, and ‘makes’ to 
manufacturers, we  were able to correctly  assign each entry to a manufacturer.  In the 
above case, for instance, we assigned that particular entry into the luxury sport segment 
to  Honda.  There  were  361  such  entries  by  foreign  manufacturers  in  our  observation 
window.  
While some of our independent variables are at the segment level (e.g. segment 
density), others are at the firm-segment level (e.g. a firm’s experience in a segment). The 
latter  vary  across  firm-segment  pairs  and  for  each  firm-segment,  across  years.  Our 
dependent variable – whether a firm entered a segment or not in a given year - is also at 
the firm-segment level. In order to be able to include these variables, we created year-  
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firm-segment spells. That is, for each year, we created all possible combinations of firms 
and segments. With 18 years of data, the number of foreign firms per year varied between 
22 in 1986 and 15 in 2003 and the number of segments per year between 23 and 26. 
Hence the number of firm-segments, i.e. the number of firms multiplied by the number of 
segments, varied from year to year and in the final sample we had 8173 firm-segment-
years.  
3.4.4  Measurement 
 
Dependent Variable 
We use a dummy variable Eijt to capture the decision of a foreign assembler to 
enter a market segment or not in a given year. We code Eijt 1 if a firm i in the risk set 
entered segment j in year t and 0 otherwise. There were 361 firm-segment-years in which 
an entry by a foreign assembler occurred. 
Independent variables 
We propose two types of independent variables; for a given year, the first varies 
across firm-segments (e.g. firm’s past experience in a segment) while the second varies 
only across segments (e.g. segment density).  
All  independent  variables  were  lagged,  so  they  predict  entries  for  the  year 
following the one for which they were computed. Understandably, the number of useable 
observations falls because of this procedure. Lagged values are returned as missing in all 
cases where the firm-segment pair did not exist in the previous year such as at the start of 
our observation window in 1986 and when either the firm or segment was new (i.e., the 
foreign firm had just entered the US, or the segment had just emerged). We were finally 
left with 7010 useable year-firm-segment spells.  
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Our  measure  of  multi-market  contact  is  derived  from  the  number  of  market 
segments in which a pair of firms overlaps. Given that the firm-segment level is our level 
of analysis, it is impossible to include a dyad-level measure of multi-market contact; a 
dyad-level measure is possible only when the level of analysis is firm-pairs. Hence, we 
aggregate multi-market contact between pairs of firms into a firm-in-segment measure 
(Gimeno & Jeong, 2001) thus getting at the aggregate level of a firm’s multi-market 
contact with all its multi-market rivals in a given segment. Specifically, we adopt the 
Haveman & Nonnemaker (2000) measure which aggregates across all multi-market rivals 
of a firm in a segment. Our measure is thus the ratio of the number of market segments a 
firm shares with each multi-market rival to the total number of segments in which the 
firm is present. This measure gives an indication of the intensity of multi-market contact 
between a firm and its multi-market competitors that are present in a given segment in a 
given year. Essentially the measure is: 



















  × ×
 





where, MMCimt is the aggregate of multi-market contact firm i faces in segment m 
in time t, MPRijt is a dummy that takes 1 if j is a multi-market competitor of i in time t, 
Djmt is a dummy that takes 1 if j was present in segment m at time t, Dint and Djnt  are 
dummies that takes 1 if i was present in segment n at time t, and if j was present in 
segment n at time t respectively, and k is the total number of segments available for entry 
in a given year.  
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  For  example,  in  1995,  Toyota  was  present  in  fifteen  segments  including  the 
luxury  sport  car  segment.  It  shared  the  luxury  sport  segment  with  ten  other 
manufacturers, nine of which were Toyota’s multi-market competitors. That is, nine of 
the ten firms in the luxury sport segment competed with Toyota in other market segments 
as well.  
  To  compute  the  multi-market  contact  measure  for  Toyota  in  the  luxury  sport 
segment for 1995, we first calculated for each of Toyota’s multi-market competitor in the 
segment the ratio of the number of segments shared with Toyota to the total number of 
segments Toyota was present in that year, in this case 15. Toyota competed with Nissan 
in ten segments that year and hence its multi-market contact with Nissan was 0.66, i.e., 
10 divided by 15. Toyota overlapped with Mazda, yet another one of its multi-market 
rivals in the luxury sport segment, in 8 market segments that year. Toyota’s multi-market 
contact with Mazda was therefore 0.53 (i.e. 8 divided by 15). We then added up the ratios 
for all nine multi-market competitors in the segment to arrive at the final measure of the 
intensity  of  multi-market  competition  Toyota  faces  in  that  segment.  To  test  for  an 
inverted U-shaped effect, we also include a quadratic term. 
Experience of a firm with a segment for a given year is captured by counting the 
number of prior entries into the segment by that firm. In order to model a decreasing 
marginal effect, we use a logarithmic transformation of this count. To avoid undefined 
logarithmic values, we first added 1 to the number of prior entries and then computed the 
logarithm.   
We measure segment density as the count of all car lines in a segment in a given 
year. We include car lines belonging to both US and non-US assemblers in this count. In  
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order to test hypothesis 3, we also include the squared term of this variable. To test 
hypothesis 4, which suggests a linear negative effect, we run a separate model without the 
quadratic term. 
Control Variables 
It is potentially dangerous to compare intensity of competition across segments 
using  the  variable  segment  density  without  taking  the  size  of  the  segment  into 
consideration. For example, a segment with only five car lines could still entail more 
competition between lines than a segment with, say, twenty lines if there are significant 
differences in total market demand in the two segments. To scale the segment density 
variable across time and across segments, we controlled for the size and growth of the 
segment. We used the total number of  cars sold in the previous  year  as a proxy for 
segment  size  and  the  percentage  change  in  sales  over  the  previous  year  to  measure 
segment growth.  
There is a potential confound between our multimarket competition measure and 
firm size. Larger firms, ceteris paribus, are more likely to be present in multiple market 
segments and hence more likely to have higher levels of multi-market contact with other 
firms. In order to separate the effects of multi-market contact and size, we explicitly 
controlled for firm size. We measured firm size as the total number of cars sold across all 
market segments in a given year. The firm size variable also controls for other possible 
size-correlated  influences  on  a  firm’s  propensity  to  enter  a  segment  such  as  the 
availability of slack managerial and financial resources  and the ability to access new 
funds for the expansion.  
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Similarly, large rivals are more likely to be present in multiple segments and thus 
have high levels of multi-market contact with the focal firm. To separate the effects of 
size of the rivals from our multi-market contact measure we need to control for the size of 
multi-market  rivals  in  a  segment  (Haveman  &  Nonnemaker,  2000).  Given  that  our 
analysis is at the firm-segment level, we cannot control for the individual size of each 
multi-market competitor. So, using total sales as a proxy for firm size, we calculated the 
aggregate size of multi-market competitors a firm faces in a segment. We counted the 
total number of cars sold in a year for each multi-market rival a firm faced in a segment 
and aggregated this across all its multi-market rivals in the segment.   
Furthermore,  firms  may  have  different  propensities  towards  diversity  in  their 
segment portfolio and this could affect their propensity to enter a given segment at a 
given time. To capture this influence, we included a firm’s present level of diversification 
across segments. We assume that the current level of diversification across segments is 
indicative of a firm’s inherent preference for diversity. Firms that prefer generalist market 
postures straddling multiple segments may be more likely to enter a given segment in a 
particular  year than firms that maintain more focused, narrow portfolios. To measure 
diversification, we used an application of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (Blau, 1977; 
Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000). The index for firm i in time t was calculated as the 
following ratio summed over all segments: 
   
1




Number of lines in a segment
Total number of lines =
 
 
  ∑  
  where k denotes the total number of segments in a given year. To get a 
measure that increases with product diversification, we subtracted this summed ratio from  
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1. For firms that operate in only one segment this index takes the value of 0. If all lines 
are equally distributed across all segments and there are, say, 25 segments the index will 
equal 1 – (1/25) = 0.96 
Three design-related issues we need to tackle in our data are the problems of left 
truncation,  potential  non-independence  of  observations  and  unobserved  firm 
heterogeneity. 
Left-truncation 
Given that our observation window starts in 1986, we are potentially susceptible 
to problems of left-truncation. We do not have information on firms that exited the U.S 
market before 1986. Also, while almost all of our firms had made segment entries prior to 
1986, we do not explicitly have information on when these entries occurred. However, 
we are not totally ignoring information from pre-1986 entries. We do use information 
from  these  entries  to  compute  our  density  count,  prior  experience  and  multi-market 
competition variables. In addition, since over 90% of the foreign firms in our sample had 
entered the US market before 1986, left truncation of the data at the year 1986 enabled us 
to separate the foreign market entry and segment entry decision processes. 
Non-independence of observations 
Our unit of analysis is the firm-segment and in our data we pool observations on 
firm-segments  over  time.  So  in  essence,  we  have  repeat  observations  of  firms  and 
segments across years. In such datasets more general firm-level factors could influence 
the behavior of firms in all segments and the more general segment-level factors could 
influence the behavior of all firms in a given segment. Repeated observations could be a 
source  of  non-independence  of  observations  and  potentially  lead  to  cross-sectional  
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autocorrelation. To reduce this source of potential correlation between observations, we 
included both time varying, firm-level control variables (firm size and firm-level product 
diversity) as well as firm-level dummies. We expect that these firm-level controls will 
take out the firm-level influences that otherwise would cause correlation between error 
terms within a firm over time. To attenuate error-term correlations due to segment-level 
influences, we included both time varying, segment-level control variables (segment size 
and growth) as well as segment dummies. Together with year dummies, we believe these 
control  variables  should  remove  the  sources  of  correlation  between  error  terms  and 
attenuate the risk of downward biased standard error estimates. To be completely sure, 
however, we also adjusted our standard errors to allow for clustering on firm-segments, 
using the “cluster” command in STATA. 
Unobserved firm heterogeneity 
The  third  issue  we  need  to  confront  is  unobserved  heterogeneity  in  the 
propensities of firms to enter particular segments in a given year. One potential source of 
this heterogeneity is inter-firm alliances and cross-ownership. For example, Ford owns a 
controlling  stake  in  Mazda,  and  GM  and  Toyota  have  a  joint-venture,  NUMMI,  to 
manufacture and sell cars in the US. One could argue that given these cross-firm interests 
Mazda and Toyota may not enter segments where their American partners are present.  
Another  unobserved  firm-level  influence  on  entry  propensity  is  the  product 
portfolio of foreign firms in their home country. If Honda already makes a small car in 
Japan, it is more likely to enter the small car segment in the US as well. Unfortunately we 
were not able to explicitly control for this firm-level influence due to the unavailability of 
data on product portfolios of the firms in their home and other countries.  
  79     
Scale economies are yet another unobserved effect. Since designing, developing 
and producing engines and platforms for a car line entail significant overhead costs, firms 
may try to share these across different car lines. This could mean that a firm may have 
higher propensities to re-enter with a new line a market segment it is already in or to enter 
adjacent market segments in order to gain economies of scale in design and production. 
Since our data is not detailed enough, we are unable to identify when technologies and 
platforms are shared across lines and hence we are unable to explicitly control for this 
effect. 
However, we do account for the fact that firms may have different propensities to 
enter a given segment in a given year due to unobserved reasons, above and beyond those 
we hypothesize. We allow baseline entry propensities to vary across all firm-segment-
year combinations by employing firm segment and year fixed effects. The constant term 
in our model represents the baseline hazard – the autonomous propensity of a firm to 
enter a segment in a given year. Without fixed effects, this is set to be the same for all 
firms. By including dummies, however, we allow this baseline hazard to vary by firms, 
segment and years. That is, we set the autonomous probability of entering to be different 
for every firm in every segment for every year
4. These fixed effects also reduce any 
potential endogeneity biases that could result if unobserved firm, segment or year-level 
influences are correlated with any of our independent variables
5. 
                                                 
4 We are aware that firm, segment and year fixed effects control for unobserved firm, segment, and year 
effects independently, and strictly speaking, are not the most appropriate controls for unobserved effects in 
our context. Please see appendix A at the end of this chapter for our discussion on this.  
   
5 We thank Renata Kosova for pointing this out to us.  
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   Finally, we used robust standard errors in our estimation to control for any sort 
of  heteroscedasticity.  This  was  over  and  above  adjusting  the  standard  errors  to 
accommodate data clustering at the firm-segment level. 
 
Modelling procedure 
We  use  a  discrete-time  hazard  rate  model  to  analyze  segment  entry  (Allison, 
1984; Henisz & Delios, 2001). The hazard rate Hijt is defined here as the probability that 
firm i will enter segment j in time t. We model the hazard rate to vary with our theoretical 
and control variables while allowing the autonomous hazard rate – the baseline hazard – 
to vary across every combination of firm, segment and year by including firm, segment, 
and  year  dummies  along  with  the  intercept  in  our  model.  To  bound  the  hazard  rate 








  −  
= b Xjt + c Xijt + εijt 
Where b and c are vectors of coefficients and Xjt and Xijt are matrices of explanatory 
segment-year and firm-segment-year varying variables respectively. εijt contains the error 
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3.5  RESULTS 
Table  3.3  shows  descriptive  statistics  and  pair-wise  correlations  between  the 
variables.  There  are  some  significant  correlations  between  our  theoretical  variables, 
multi-market competition, segment experience and density. To ensure the robustness of 
our results, we entered these variables hierarchically into our analyses. This allowed us to 
observe the stability of our coefficient estimates across models.   
The results of the discrete time logit model are presented in table 3.4 (standard 
errors in parentheses). A positive sign for a coefficient implies that the corresponding 
variable has a positive effect on the probability of entry into a segment, and a negative 
sign implies the reverse.  
 Model 1 is the base model with control variables. In model 2 we include the 
multi-market competition variable and its quadratic term in order to test hypothesis 1. 
Model  3  includes  prior  segment  entry  experience  while  controlling  for  multi-market 
competition and model 4 is the full model where segment density and its squared term are 
entered as well. Model 5 is yet another specification where we drop the quadratic term of 
the segment density variable in order to test for any linear effect of segment density 
(hypothesis 4). 
Likelihood ratio tests are useful indicators of model fit when using maximum 
likelihood methods. They test for statistically significant improvements in log-likelihood 
values between models when one is nested within the other. These tests in our analyses 
show significant improvements in log-likelihood as our theoretical variables are gradually  
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entered in models 2, 3 and 5
6. The Wald test chi-square (which is analogous to the F 
statistic  in  multiple  regression)  is  highly  significant  in  all  models,  implying  that  the 
variables in each are jointly significant and fit  the data better than  an  intercept only 
model.    
Across  all  models,  we  find  that  the  size  and  growth  rate  of  a  segment  have 
positive effects on the propensity of a given firm to enter. In all specifications except 
model 1, we also find a significant negative relationship between the aggregate size of a 
firm’s  multi-market  rivals  in  a  segment  and  that  firm’s  probability  of  entering  that 
segment in a given year. These results are in line with our expectations and suggest that 
firms are attracted to segments that have large buyer populations that are still growing 
but, at the same time, that they are deterred by the presence of large competitors. The 
inclusion of these variables, as explained earlier while discussing control variables, also 
serves to normalize the segment density variable across segments and time, and partial 
out any competitor size effect from the multi-markets competition measure. 
Model 2 includes variables denoting the extent of multi-market competition a 
potential entrant faces with incumbents of a given target segment. To test our prediction 
of  an  inverted  U-shaped  relationship,  we  include  both  the  main  term  multi-market 
competition and its squared term multi-market competition squared in this model. The 
coefficient of the first order term is positive and significant (p<0.01) and that of the 
quadratic term is negative and significant (p<0.05). These two results, together with the 
fact  that  the  point  of  inflection  is  within  the  range  of  the  multi-market  competition 
variable in our sample, offer support for hypothesis 1. The predominant effect of multi-
                                                 
6 Model 4, though, where we test for a quadratic effect of segment density, does not show any improvement 
in fit over model 3. Also, model 5 shows significant improvement in log-likelihood over model 3 but not 
over model 4.  
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market competition on entry is positive, however, given that the point of inflection occurs 
at a high value of multi-market competition. In other words, we find that a firm will enter 
a given segment up to the point where it faces incumbent competitors in quite a few other 
market segments as well, after which its rate of entry slows down.  
We  argued  that  prior  entry  experience  in  a  segment  positively  influences  the 
propensity to enter that segment at a given point in time, but at a decreasing rate. Model 3 
tests this hypothesis by including segment experience, a logarithmic transformation of the 
number of prior entries a firm has made into the segment. We find a highly significant 
positive  relationship  between  segment  experience  and  entry,  and  thus  support  for 
hypothesis 2.  
In model 4, the coefficient of the first order term segment density is negative 
while  that  of  the  quadratic  term  segment  density  squared  is  positive.  Both  these 
coefficients are not significant and we are thus unable to corroborate hypothesis 3 which 
predicts an inverted-U shaped effect of segment density on entry propensity. Model 5 is 
an alternative specification similar to model 4 but for the fact that we leave out the 
quadratic term, segment density squared. In this specification, the coefficient of segment 
density turns out negative and significant (p<0.05). We interpret this as empirical support 
for  hypothesis  4  which,  from  a  spatial  competition  perspective,  predicts  a  negative 
relationship between segment density and entry propensity.  
3.6  DISCUSSION 
This  paper  sets  out  to  explain  variations  in  the  propensity  of  firms  to  enter 
industry segments. We argue that multiple theoretical perspectives can be brought to bear 
on  the  phenomenon  and  develop  predictions  from  strategic  management,  behavioral,  
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population ecology and spatial competition perspectives. The key predictors of segment 
entry that emerge from these perspectives are multi-market competition, momentum or 
prior  experience,  and  segment  density.  We  then  test  for  the  effect  of  each  of  these 
constructs using data on market segment entry decisions of foreign manufacturers in the 
US automobile market over the 1986 to 2003 period.  
Our  results  suggest  that  multi-market  competition,  strategic  momentum  and 
spatial competition theories are worthwhile lenses to use when explaining segment entry. 
Everything else constant, low levels of multi-market competition encourage entry. This 
effect  weakens  and  reverses,  however,  at  very  high  levels  of  our  multi-market 
competition measure. We also find that while segment density – the number of car lines 
already in the segment – has a negative effect, a firm’s prior segment entry experience 
has a positive effect on its propensity to enter that segment.  
Our  key  conceptual  contribution  lies  in  the  application  of  various  theoretical 
perspectives  to  the  market  segment  level.  Market  segments  are  pockets  of  relatively 
homogeneous  customers  within  markets  and  we  know  relatively  little  about  whether 
organizational  theories  can  predict  firm  behavior  within  these  market  sub-structures. 
Therefore,  in  addition  to  opening  up  a  new,  interesting  level  of  analysis  –  the  firm-
segment level –, this paper takes up the theoretical mandate to explore whether and how 
organizational theory can be brought to predict firm behavior at this level.  
Our level of analysis is interesting from the point of view of population ecology 
research. There seems to be some confusion among ecologists about the boundaries of a 
population.  While  earlier  empirical  work  assumed  that  an  industry  within  a  country 
constituted a ‘unitary population’, recent work has started to suggest that populations can  
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be  more  heterogeneous  than  that.  Scholars  have  sought  to  explore  the  fundamental 
processes  of  legitimation  and  competition  within  and  across  different  “slices”  of 
populations.  For  example,  Cattani  et.al.  (2003)  slice  the  population  along  geographic 
lines to suggest that legitimation and competition processes unfold at much lower levels 
than  earlier  anticipated,  in  their  case  at  the  level  of  Dutch  provinces.  Despite  these 
advances, however, most of the intra-population heterogeneity has been thought to come 
from spatial differences. That is, rather than assuming that all organizations in, say, the 
Dutch accounting industry are similar, these studies suggest that these organizations can 
differ across provinces. Our study offers yet another means of taking intra-population 
heterogeneity into account. We define sub-populations on the basis of market segments 
and  hence  the  demarcating  line  is  not  geography  but  discontinuities  in  the  resource 
endowment of a market. By examining ecological dynamics at this level, we contribute to 
current  debates  in  population  ecology  on  the  boundaries  of  populations  and  on  the 
appropriate level of analysis. 
Furthermore, studies in the ecological tradition of organizational founding and 
entry into a population can rarely distinguish between foundings and non-foundings. This 
is because it is very difficult to define a risk set in founding studies. The sample selection 
protocol does not pick up firms that tried to enter but failed. Hence one would assume 
that the diversity of organizations in founding studies is underestimated (Amburgey & 
Rao, 1996). In studying the niche entry of a defined population such as foreign firms, we 
observe both firms that enter and those that do not enter a niche.  This design allows us to 
observe more organizational heterogeneity in the risk set.  
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The level of  analysis in our study is  also immensely  relevant to international 
business research. International business researchers studying the geographic scope of the 
firm and especially entry into foreign markets have tried to explain differences in a firm’s 
propensity to expand abroad (Hennart & Park 1994; Martin & Salomon, 2003), as well as 
how  internationalizing  firms  differ  in  their  choice  of  entry  and  governance  modes 
(Hennart, 1991; Hennart & Park 1993). Another strand of foreign market entry research 
has examined variations in plant location, both across potential host countries (Henisz & 
Delios, 2001) and within a single host country (Chung & Alcacer, 2002). There hasn’t 
been much research, however, on variations in segment entry propensities in a given host 
country market. In other words, while managers of internationalizing firms need to make 
decisions on entry modes and plant locations, they also need to choose which market 
segments to enter; and international business research has not examined this decision in 
much  detail.  Our  study  seeks  to  bridge  these  gaps:  we  add  to  extant  research  by 
examining a different type of variation (i.e. variation in foreign firms’ market segment 
entry behavior) in the international expansion process, focusing on the market segment as 
the level of analysis. 
Discussing  various  perspectives,  we  offered  entry  deterrence  and  spatial 
competition  arguments  as  rival  approaches  to  density  dependence  theory  to  explain 
segment-entry. We argued that the predictions from both perspectives with regard to the 
role of segment density differ. Our results do not seem to confirm the density dependence 
prediction that previous entries encourages further entry at low levels of density because 
of legitimizing forces while it discourages entry at high levels of density because of 
overcrowding.  Instead,  the  data  suggests  a  linear  and  negative  relationship  between  
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segment  density  and  entry  propensity,  which  we  interpret  as  support  for  the  spatial 
competition  argument.  Nevertheless,  we  do  not  hasten  to  conclude  that  legitimation 
forces are totally unimportant, or to claim to invalidate the whole set of prior empirical 
support  in  the  population  ecology  literature  for  the  density  dependence  hypothesis 
because  of  differences  between  our  study  design  and  that  of  organizational  founding 
studies that test density dependence theory. In order to convincingly show that density 
dependence theory is irrelevant to market segment entry, one would have to do so using a 
research  design  similar  to  that  of  traditional  density  dependence  studies  on  entry. 
Typically, such studies adopt the population as the level of analysis, consider the target 
population as being at risk of experiencing entry, and use a count of the number of entries 
in a given population in a given year as the dependent variable. In our study, the firm-
segment  is  the  level  of  analysis,  the  foreign  firm,  and  not  the  target  segment,  is 
considered at risk of entry, and the dependent variable is not a count of entries, but rather 
a discrete variable denoting if a firm entered a given segment in a given year or not. 
These  differences  may  account  for  our  lack  of  support  for  the  density  dependence 
argument.   
Our  results  are  also  interesting  for  research  on  multi-market  competition  and 
strategic momentum. We add to the range of contexts in which both theories have been 
held  to  operate.  We  show  that  the  theoretical  mechanisms  proposed  by  multi-market 
competition theorists are operational at the market-segment level. The stream of multi-
market competition has focused primarily on issues such as prices charged and market 
exit. With the exception of Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000; Stephan & Boeker, 2001 and 
Greve, 2000, there hasn’t been much research on multi-market contact and how it affects  
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market entry.  The functional form of the effect has also been under contention. For 
example, while Greve (2000) suggests a linear effect, Haveman & Nonnemaker (2000) 
emphasize  a  non-linear,  quadratic  effect.  This  study  adds  to  the  weight  of  evidence 
behind the notion that the extent of a firm’s strategic interdependence with rivals does 
indeed influence its behavior. We find that across the lower range of overlap in market 
segments,  firms  are  motivated  to  enter  new  segments  to  further  solidify  their 
interdependencies with rivals. At much higher ranges of multi-market contact, however, 
these very interdependencies act more as a deterrent to entry.  
Also,  while  there  is  prior  evidence  for  strategic  momentum  in  the  case  of 
acquisitions (Amburgey & Miner, 1992) and alliance formation (Martin & Park, 2004), 
our  study  may  offer  further  validation  for  momentum  theory  in  the  case  of  market 
segment  entry.  One  caveat,  however,  is  that  we  do  not  have  direct  evidence  for  our 
arguments  of  momentum  and  uncertainty  avoidance.  We  observe  firms  re-entering 
segments  but  cannot  unequivocally  assert  that  this  is  due  to  momentum  or  learning 
effects. It could be that firms are re-entering segments to exploit the fixed costs already 
incurred in entering the segment.  
It is possible that our results are specific to the specific industry and observation 
window we have chosen. Future research could increase their generalizibility by studying 
segment entries in other industries, and by using different time periods. One promising 
avenue for theoretical development is to tease out specific conditions under which one 
perspective will have stronger effects or predictability relative to the others. A longer 
panel would also allow us to examine if certain theories predict relatively better during  
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specific stages in the growth of the industry. This would help us better understand some 
of the boundaries within which each of the relevant perspectives operates.  
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APPENDIX A 
We are aware that firm, segment and year fixed effects control for unobserved firm, segment and 
year  effects  independently,  and  strictly  speaking,  are  not  the  most  appropriate  controls  for 
unobserved  effects  in  our  context.  This  is  because  fixed  effects  assume  that  the  unobserved 
characteristics we are controlling for are “fixed” and non-varying. For example, firm fixed effects 
account for firm-level determinants of segment entry that vary between firms but are constant 
across segments and years. Firm dummies, thus, do not completely take care of the effect of, say, 
alliances, simply because the effect of alliances is not fixed – it varies from segment to segment, 
and  exists  only  for  the  years  the  alliance  is  operational.  In  the  years  after  they  are  formed, 
alliances may increase a firm’s probability to enter segments where such entry is part of the 
alliance strategy and decrease its probability to enter such segments where the alliance partner is 
already present ( i.e., where entry will entail competition with products of the partner). So clearly, 
since  alliance  effects  are  not  constant  across  years  and  segments,  firm  fixed  effects  cannot 
completely account for them. Instead, we need to use firm-segment-year interaction dummies that 
allow firm effects to vary across segments and years. 
 
However, while they are indeed the strongest controls, adding interactions between firm, segment 
and year dummies is impractical, because there will be one dummy for every observation in our 
data.  
 
A second-best alternative is to use firm-segment dummies instead. This is better than simple firm 
dummies because it allows firm-level effects (such as that of alliances) to vary from segment to 
segment. Firm-segment dummies too, however, come at a cost. Firstly, this will again mean 
adding a large number of dummy variables to the model – one for each firm-segment- taking 
away considerable degrees of freedom. Secondly, these dummies absorb all the cross-sectional 
variation in our data, leaving its panel nature to provide all the necessary variation. For example, 
multi-market competition and entry experience, two variables in our model, vary cross-sectionally 
across  firm-segments  (the  multi-market  competition  a  firm  faces  differs  from  segment  to 
segment, and a firm’s entry experience for each segment is different), and temporally for each 
firm-segment  (e.g.,  the  segment-specific  multi-market  competition  a  firm  faces  changes  over 
time, as its multi-market rivals enter that segment. Also, as a firm makes new entries into a given 
segment, its entry experience for that particular segment varies over time). Adding a dummy for 
every firm-segment will take away all the variation in these variables that is cross-sectional, i.e., 
across firm-segments. That leaves us only with the variation in variables that comes from their 
change over time. In our study, it is new entries by the focal and other firm that provide temporal 
variation in the variables. For example, in a given firm-segment, the experience variable changes 
as  the  firm  makes  new  entries  into  the  segment.  Similarly,  in  the  multi-market  competition 
variable, for a given firm-segment, it is entries by the focal firm and its competitors in successive 
years that provides variation over time. Given the relatively limited number of entries in our data, 
temporal  variation  in  the  variables  is  rather  limited;  most  of  the  variation  is  cross-sectional. 
Taking out this cross-sectional variation by using firm-segment dummies would then leave us 
with statistically insignificant results. 
 
As a third alternative, we ran models with firm-year and segment-year fixed effects to allow for 
firm and segment effects that vary across years. In these specifications our results did not differ 
from  those  we  report  here,  because  these  dummies  take  away  only  temporal  and  not  cross-
sectional variation.   
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CHAPTER 4 
BOUNDARIES OF DENSITY-DEPENDENCE: FOREIGN ENTRY RATES IN 




Density  dependence  theory  suggests  that  legitimation  and  competition  forces 
shape  founding,  entry  and  mortality  rates  in  a  population  of  firms,  and  thereby,  its 
evolution. In its original form, the theory focuses primarily on temporal evolution of 
populations - on how populations grow over time and how density dependent processes 
of  legitimation  and  competition  shape  this  growth.  There  has  been  relatively  less 
attention to the spatial distribution of populations, i.e., the clustering of organizations in 
different areas in the population. Correspondingly, we also know relatively little about 
the spatial boundaries of the density effect: whether the density dependent processes (of 
legitimation and competition) have a population wide spatial reach or whether they are 
strongest within such spatially clustered sub-populations of firms. 
   In this paper we seek to bridge this gap and examine the boundaries of the density 
effect.  We  argue  for  ‘local  density  dependence’  where  density  effects  are  strongest 
among firms that have similar resource dependencies, e.g., firms inhabiting the same 
market segment and thus depending on the same buyer base. We also argue that the 
effects will be strongest among firms that share similar identities such as among foreign 
firms operating in a given host country. Our empirical analyses, using data on the entry of 
foreign firms into various market segments in the US automobile industry between 1986 
and  2003,  suggest  that  density  effects  are  indeed  stronger  among  firms  in  the  same 
                                                 
7 I thank Jean-Francois Hennart and Xavier Martin for their valuable comments on various drafts of this 
chapter  
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market segment. We also find that the number of foreign incumbents in the segment 
significantly influences the entry rates of foreign firms into that segment. 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
Organizational  ecologists  have  been  interested  in  explaining  the  evolution  of 
populations of organizational forms. Correspondingly, they have focused considerable 
energies  on  studying  the  entry  and  mortality  rates  of  organizations,  which  together 
determine the pattern of population evolution over time.  
Density  dependence  theory,  a  central  argument  in  organizational  ecology, 
suggests that legitimization and competition forces in a population shape its entry and 
exit rates. Legitimization and competition in turn are a function of population density - 
the  number  of  organizations  in  the  population.  Proponents  of  the  theory  expect  an 
inverted U shaped relationship between population density and entry rates. In the early 
stages of population growth, when there are very few organizations in the population, 
additional entries convey positive signals to other potential entrants about the viability of 
the  organizational  form  and  the  munificence  of  resources  to  sustain  it.  This  will 
‘legitimize’  and  attract  new  entries  into  the  population.  However,  this  legitimization 
effect will not persist indefinitely. Given the fact that any environment has a limited 
carrying  capacity,  additional  entries  at  high  levels  of  population  density  cause  over-
crowding and intense competition for scarce resources. This ‘competition effect’ will 
make entry unattractive, and decrease entry rates into the population. These two effects of 
density  on  entry  rates  –  the  positive  but  diminishing  legitimization  and  subsequent  
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negative  competition  effects  -  give  rise  to  the  inverted  U  shaped  curve  that  density 
dependence theorists expect.   
In its original form, the theory focuses primarily on the temporal evolution of 
populations, that is, on how populations grow over time and how the density dependent 
processes of legitimation and competition shape this (Greve, 2002; Hannan & Carroll, 
1992; Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Hannan, 1986). There has been relatively less attention 
by ecologists to the spatial distribution, i.e., the clustering of organizations in different 
areas in the population space, and to the boundaries of populations (Lomi, 1995; Singh, 
1993). Correspondingly, we also know relatively little about the boundaries of the density 
effect.  Do  the  density  dependent  processes  of  legitimation  and  competition  have  a 
population wide spatial reach or do they operate largely within spatially bounded sub-
populations  of  firms?  While  we  do  know  from  past  research  that  legitimation  and 
competition effects influence population entry rates over time, the question still remains 
as to the levels of spatial aggregation at which these ecological processes function.  
There  has  also  been  relatively  less  attention  to  intra-population  heterogeneity, 
again due to the predominantly temporal focus of density dependence theory. An implicit 
assumption so far has been that populations, typically defined at the national-industry 
level  (e.g.  populations  of  US  brewing  firms  and  telephone  companies),  are  largely 
homogeneous and unitary in character. A notion that further derives from this assumption 
is  that  all  organizations  equally  influence  and  are  equally  influenced  by  other 
organizations in the population (Baum & Amburgey, 2002: 315).  In other words, all 
incumbents  contribute,  and  all  potential  entrants  react  uniformly,  to  legitimation  and 
competition  forces  in  the  population.  Yet  organizations  are  heterogeneous  and  it  is  
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plausible that they may contribute differently to the density effect; for example, larger 
firms may exert more competitive pressures than smaller ones (Barnett & Amburgey, 
1990). Also, potential entrants into a population could also be influenced differently by 
the density effect. They could be selectively sensitive to signals from particular kinds of 
incumbents, such as those from other similar firms. And this could result in stronger 
density effects among such firms.  
Our key focus in this paper is on boundaries of the density effect on entry rates 
into  populations.  For  a  boundary  to  be  meaningful,  it  should  effectively  segregate 
ecological processes so that the density effect is stronger within than across the boundary. 
In  fact,  theorizing  about  boundaries  effectively  equates  to  specifying  levels  of 
aggregation  in  the  population  where  legitimization  and  competition  forces  –  which 
together constitute the ‘density effect’ – are operational, and have strongest effects. The 
forces should also be relatively weaker across the sub-populations thus defined. 
We propose two levels of aggregation that bound the effect of legitimation and 
competition. First, we aggregate firms based on their location in resource space and argue 
that legitimation and competition are strongest among firms that share similar resource 
dependencies e.g., among those selling highly substitutable products to consumers in the 
same market segment and thus depending on the same buyer base for survival. Second, 
we aggregate firms based on shared identities. We propose that density effects do not 
affect all firms equally  strongly but will be strongest among firms that share similar 
identities, in our case foreign firms in a host market. Because of similarities in identities, 
we  argue,  potential  foreign  entrants  are  more  alert  and  sensitive  to  legitimation  and 
competition signals from foreign than from domestic incumbents.  And as a result, the  
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density  effect  will  be  stronger  within  that  sub-population,  as  opposed  to  across  sub-
populations  of  foreign  and  domestic  firms.  In  short,  the  boundaries  to  the  density 
dependence effect that we specify are based on proximity between firms, both in their 
resource dependencies and their identities. 
To test these ideas, we chose the empirical context of the entry of foreign firms 
into the US automobile industry over a period of nearly two decades. Specifically, we 
looked at the entry rates of foreign firms into various segments of the US automobile 
market and the effect on these entry rates of densities of foreign and US incumbents in 
those segments. Market segments are confluences of buyers with relatively homogeneous 
traits and so firms selling in the same segment are dependent on the same kind of buyer 
for survival. We use market segments to represent areas in resource space where firms 
share  similar  resource  dependencies.  Segments  are  relatively  easy  to  identify  in  the 
automobile industry and this makes it a suitable setting to test our hypotheses. Also, since 
foreign firms share common identities relative to domestic US firms, foreign entry into 
segments in the US market allows us to test if shared identities bound the density effect; 
i.e., if potential foreign entrants are more sensitive to density effects from other foreign 
incumbents in the segment than from domestic ones. 
The  empirical  results  support  our  main  hypotheses.  We  find  that  the  existing 
number of competitors in the segment (segment density) has a significant effect on entry 
rates of foreign firms into those segments. This shows that the segment, rather than the 
population  as  extant  literature  suggests,  is  a  relevant  level  of  aggregation  at  which 
density-dependent processes operate. We also find that foreign firms contemplating entry 
do not seem to look at all the firms already in the segment, but mostly at other foreign  
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firms in the segment. In other words, for them it is the foreign component of segment 
density which is significant. When we include foreign density – the count of foreign 
participants in the segment – into the model, segment density becomes insignificant and 
foreign segment density shows the traditional inverted U relationship with foreign entry 
rates into the segment. We interpret our results as suggesting that the density effects 
uncovered in the population ecology literature do not uniformly apply across the whole 
population.  Indeed  our  results  show  that  they  work  better  within  sub-populations. 
Specifically they work better at the segment than at the industry level, and better between 
firms that share similar identities than between all organizations.   
 
4.2  THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
4.2.1  Segment-level density dependence 
In its original form, density dependence theory focuses on temporal evolution and 
is relatively ambiguous about the spatial boundaries of a population. Correspondingly, 
theorists have also been relatively unclear about the boundaries of density dependent 
legitimation and competition. An implicit assumption hitherto has been that legitimation 
and competition have uniformly strong effects throughout the entire population. 
Some  recent  research  (e.g.  Cattani  et.al.,  2003;  Greve,  2002;  Lomi,  1995), 
however, has started to evaluate this assumption by focusing on the spatial dimension of 
populations.  These  scholars  depart  from  a  nationally  homogeneous  conception  of  a 
population  and  suggest  that  populations  are  homogeneous,  but  only  within  narrow 
geographical boundaries such as regions, states or provinces. Entry and mortality rates 
vary across these regionally bounded populations, and hence the two ecological processes  
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of legitimation and competition need to be sought and explained at these local, non-
national levels of aggregation as well. In essence, their argument is that one can use 
geographic boundaries to infuse a spatial dimension into the definition of populations and 
correspondingly, to specify the boundaries of legitimation and competition effects. 
   These  scholars  argue  that  legitimation  and  competition  have  stronger  effects 
within regional populations. This is because diffusion of legitimacy can be hampered by 
spatial distance and because rivalry for local resources, such as buyers and suppliers, is 
most  intense  within  a  region.  Thus  in  this  view  legitimation  and  competition  forces 
generated in one part of the population may not be uniformly influential throughout the 
population,  but  more  strongly  felt  by  organizations  in  the  immediate  vicinity.  For 
example, Cattani et.al (2003) argue that the founding rate of accounting firms in the 
Brabant province of Holland is more conditioned by the density of incumbent firms in the 
province than by the number of incumbents in the Dutch accounting industry as a whole. 
Similarly, in a study on the founding of American breweries, Carroll & Wade (1991) 
observed that density effects are stronger at city and regional as opposed to higher levels 
of analysis. Greve (2002) and Lomi (1995) found similar results for Tokyo banks and 
Italian rural cooperatives.  
We position our research within this type of refinement of the traditional density 
dependence  model,  and  subscribe  to  the  view  that  density  dependence  effects  are 
bounded at a more local than national level. However, while prior research has looked for 
intra-population  boundaries  to  the  density  effect  in  geographic  space,  we  look  at 
boundaries to this effect in resource-space.   
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The  notion  of  ‘resource  space’  has  been  used  by  organizational  ecologists 
(Carroll, Dobrev & Swaminathan, 2002) to denote the endowment and distribution of 
resources, mainly potential buyers, that sustain organizations in markets. Resources are 
distributed  across  multiple  dimensions,  each  dimension  consisting  of  categories  or  a 
smooth gradient of categories (Carroll, Dobrev & Swaminathan, 2002). For example, 
newspaper buyers differ along dimensions like age, education, political affiliation and 
residence.  Potential  buyers  fall  into  ‘market  segments’  defined  by  combination  of 
categories on each dimension (e.g. the young, educated, republican New Yorker). Thus, 
resource spaces, according to ecologists, are rarely homogeneous, but characterized by 
pockets of resource homogeneity, typically called ‘market segments’ or ‘niches’. Buyers 
are relatively similar within, but different across such pockets.  
All firms, through their product offerings, are present in one or more locations in 
this resource space. The New York Times, for example, is located higher than the Daily 
News  on  the  education  dimension  of  the  newspaper  market,  (Carroll,  Dobrev  & 
Swaminathan, 2002). Porsche and Daimler Benz are situated on the higher price end of 
the car market than, say, Honda or Toyota. In other words, just as much as resources, 
firms  too  are  distributed  across  the  resource  space,  with  firms  situated  in  the  same 
location, i.e. those catering to the same market segment, relying on the same resource 
base. Firms in the same market segment thus could be said to have similar resource 
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Segment-level competition and legitimation 
The logic of prior research which has argued that competitive interdependencies 
are  higher  among  geographically  proximate  firms  is  that  the  extent  of  competition 
between firms depends on the ease with which they can sell their products in each others’ 
market. This decreases with spatial distance (Greve, 2002; Cattani et.al, 2003) and hence, 
competition is most intense between firms in the same geographical space. 
Our argument is similar, but we are interested in competitive interdependencies 
on a different plane, that of resource space. As demonstrated above, firms occupying the 
same location in resource space have similar resource dependencies. We suggest that 
competitive  interdependencies  are  strongest  when  two  firms  need  to  share  the  same 
resource  base  (Baum  &  Mezias,  1992;  Hannan  &  Freeman,  1989).  Just  as  spatial 
distance, distance and boundaries in resource space also act as isolating mechanisms that 
separate organizational populations from direct competition. Distance in resource space 
implies greater dissimilarities in resources, and firms distant from each other in the space 
essentially have different resource dependencies. Competitive pressures will be higher for 
firms that cluster together in resource space and feed from the same set of buyers (Baum 
& Singh, 1994a; Baum & Singh 1994b; McPherson, 1983). As we argued before, market 
segments represent such clustering of firms that share the same set of buyers and hence, 
competition effects should be strongest within market segments. Segment walls serve as 
boundaries to the competition effect. 
Legitimation, too, may have a more local than infinite reach in resource space. In 
the organizational ecologists’ notion of ‘legitimation of an organizational form’, what is 
essentially being legitimized, along with the form, is a location in resource space. In other  
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words, legitimation of form is basically a diffusion of knowledge about the existence, 
viability and attractiveness of the corresponding market segment or resource endowment 
in  resource  space.  This  duality  between  organizational  form  and  niche  has  been 
acknowledged by organizational ecologists (Hannan & Freeman, 1989: 50) and what it 
implies is that legitimation effects are localized in areas characterized by similar resource 
endowments.  
Both  these  arguments  of  localized  competition  and  legitimation  tell  us  that 
segments within a resource space are potential levels to explore the ecological processes 
of legitimization and competition. In this paper, we test the density dependence theory at 
the level of market segments. We argue that when the segment is occupied by very few 
entrants, there is likely to be an increase in entry rates due to its legitimation. But at 
higher levels of segment density, the resulting competition for the same set of buyers will 
lead to a decrease in entry rates. Thus: 
Hypothesis 1.a: There will be an inverted U-shaped relationship between segment density 
and rate of entry of foreign firms into that segment 
Also, 
Hypothesis 1.b: The density effect at the segment level will be stronger than that at the 
national industry level. 
4.2.2  Shared identities and density dependence 
Organizational ecologists typically define populations as firms belonging to the 
same industry with the assumption that firms within an industry are similar. An implicit 
idea that flows from this conception is that each organization equally influences and is 
equally influenced by ecological processes. That is, all firms exert the same level of  
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competitive  pressure  on  other  firms  in  the  population  and  all  they  all  have  similar 
legitimization  effects.  This  is  clear  from  the  Lotka-Volterra  equation  (Hannan  & 
Freeman, 1989) which shows that the competitive intensity in a population is dependent 
on the number of firms, irrespective of the size or nature of firms (Barnett & Amburgey, 
1990). Disagreeing with this unitary and homogeneous depiction of a population, some 
scholars argue that competition and legitimation effects are different in different parts of 
the population. Some have argued, for example, that the strongest competitive pressures 
come from the larger firms (Barnett & Amburgey, 1990) and are stronger within the 
confines of small spaces (Cattani et.al 2003; Greve, 2002; Lomi, 1995). We seek to bring 
attention to another form of intra-population heterogeneity based on firms’ nationality: 
whether they are foreign or local / domestic.  
Our argument is that ecological processes are more likely to be stronger among 
firms that share common identities. Legitimization of a resource space is essentially an 
information spillover from incumbents to potential entrants regarding the viability and 
attractiveness of the niche. Similarly, what actually determines if a potential entrant will 
enter the niche is not so much the actual level of competition in the niche, but the signals 
of overcrowding that they get from the number of existing incumbents. The question is 
whether all potential entrants are equally receptive of these signals. Do potential entrants 
pay  selective  attention  to  the  actions  of  particular  kinds  of  firms?  Do  they  have  the 
cognitive  capabilities  to  monitor  actions  of  all  other  firms  in  the  target  industry  or 
segment? 
As  Porac  &  Thomas  (1990)  have  shown,  information  spillovers  are  stronger 
between firms that share similar identities. Since the information processing demands of  
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scanning  entire  competitive  fields  are  immense,  managers  make  sense  of  their 
competitive environments by forming mental models where they categorize other firms 
based on their salient attributes, and define the most similar ones as relevant competitors 
to select out for close monitoring. In other words, firms engage in selective scanning; 
they select and monitor other firms that they perceive similar, and hence, cognitively 
relevant to themselves. Haveman (1993) suggests that size is one dimension on which 
managers define similarities. In her study on diversification in the California thrift and 
saving industry, she predicts that firms will identify other firms of similar size, monitor 
them closely, and imitate their diversification strategies. Empirical tests, however, do not 
corroborate  this  hypothesis,  and  she  concludes  that  size  was  perhaps  not  the  most 
important discriminating variable among the firms in her sample.  
We suggest that “foreignness” is a potential attribute on which potential entrants 
form mental categorizations. Foreign firms in a given host country share similar identities 
vis-à-vis  domestic  firms  on  several  counts:  First,  they  have  places  and  conditions  of 
origins that are dissimilar to those of domestic firms, and, as Hannan & Freeman (1989) 
would argue, have different “imprintings”. Second, they face similar constraints and the 
common  challenge  of  setting  up  business  and  finding  effective  ways  of  selling  their 
products in an alien country. Finally, given that they have all expanded into the same host 
country,  they  probably  share  similarities  in  strategic  direction,  decisions  making 
tendencies, and organizational structures. 
International business research has documented evidence that foreign firms have a 
collective identity, and more specifically, that foreign incumbent firms in a market can 
influence the behavior of other foreign firms. For example, Shaver, et.al (1997) argue that  
  105     
foreign entrants observe actions of earlier foreign entrants in the host market and learn 
from them. Researchers adopting an institutional-mimetic isomorphism perspective have 
documented that foreign firms tend to follow the actions of other foreign entrants in host 
countries (Henisz & Delios, 2001; Yiu & Makino, 2002). Earlier, Knickerbocker (1973) 
observed “follow the leader” behavior in foreign market entry which again suggests that 
foreign firms are sensitive to the signals from the community of foreign firms already in 
the host country.  
These arguments and findings suggest that the group of foreign firms in a host 
country is a cognitively relevant community to potential foreign entrants and hence that 
there  are  stronger  information  spillovers  between  foreign  incumbents  and  potential 
foreign entrants than between foreign incumbents and all entrants. We thus expect that 
density dependent processes of legitimation and competition will be stronger within sub-
populations of foreign firms, rather than across sub-populations of domestic and foreign 
firms. In other words, potential foreign entrants will be influenced more by the density 
effects from foreign, rather than domestic incumbents in the market segment. 
Hypothesis 2: There will be an inverted U-shaped relationship between density of foreign 
entrants in a segment and entry rates of foreign firms into that segment. 
 
4.3  SAMPLE 
4.3.1  Setting 
We test these hypotheses using data on entries of foreign assemblers into market 
segments in the US automobile industry over a period of nearly two decades (1986 – 
2003). This setting is appropriate for our purposes for two main reasons.  
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First, the US automobile industry has many active foreign manufacturers. There 
were twenty two foreign manufacturers present in 1987, though this number was down to 
fifteen in 2003. The mean market share of these foreign manufacturers was 45%, varying 
from 35% in 1986 to 64% in 2003. We define foreign manufacturers as firms based 
outside the US but selling at least one car line in the US market. Second, segments are 
relatively well-defined in this industry.  Segments are basically confluences of resources 
(mainly demand) that can sustain a particular product type. Firms are distributed across 
these  market  segments  and  firms  targeting  the  same  market  segment  have  similar 
resource  dependencies.  The  relatively  easy  segmentation  of  the  market  is  helpful  in 
testing our ideas on how similar resource dependencies strengthen the density effect. 
Market segments in the car industry 
Market  segmentation  relies  on  the  basic  premise  that  customers  are  not 
homogeneous but have differing preferences about the set of attributes they desire in their 
purchases.  Buyer  preferences  are  distributed  in  a  space  defined  by  a  number  of 
dimensions  relevant  to  the  purchase.  For  example,  newspaper  buyers  differ  along 
dimensions like age, education, political affiliation and location of  residence (Carrol, 
Dobrev & Swaminathan 2002). Each combination of values on each dimension which has 
a feasible customer population comprises a market segment (e.g. the young, educated, 
republican New Yorker constitutes a market segment for newspapers). 
In the car industry, the key dimensions along which buyer preferences vary are 
body type or frame, car size and price. Along the body type dimension customers are 
differentiated into those that prefer the ‘coupe’, ‘sedan’ or ‘hatchback’, ‘cross-utility’, 
‘sport-utility’, ‘vans’ or ‘pickup’ body types. Along the size dimension preferences fall  
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under ‘small’, ‘middle’ or ‘large’ and, on the price dimension, under ‘lower’, ‘upper’ or 
‘luxury’. Different combinations of body type, size and price give rise to confluences of 
preferences such as ‘upper middle sport utility’, ‘luxury large cross-utility’ and so on, 
that are different enough from one another that a single product will not simultaneously 
satisfy buyers in two separate segments.   
4.3.2  Sample 
The first step in putting together our sample was to identify which foreign firms 
were selling their cars in the US market for each of the years in our panel. We did not 
restrict the sample only to firms that had assembling plants in the US (e.g. Honda) but 
also included firms with off-shore plants that imported their fully or partly assembled 
cars into the country (e.g. Porsche). One of our independent variables, segment density, 
i.e. counts of segment participants, does not distinguish between foreign and US firms, so 
we also collected data on domestic assemblers during this period.  
We  relied  on  the  Ward’s  Automotive  Yearbook  to  provide  us  with  the 
segmentation  of  the  market  for  each  year.  The  Ward’s  segmentation  is  based  on 
consumer preferences for body style, size and price. Over time and as product markets 
mature, buyer preferences become more sophisticated and variegated. Accordingly, the 
number of segments also varies over time. From 1986 until 1994, Ward’s Automotive 
Yearbook listed twenty-three; between 1995 and 1999, twenty-four, and between 2000 
and  2003,  twenty-six  segments.  The  rise  in  the  number  of  segments  indicates  the 
emergence  of  new  classes  of  consumers  in  the  market.  For  example,  the  two  new 
segments in 2000 are a result of the rise of a group of consumers preferring mid-sized and  
  108     
luxury cross utility vehicles.  The concept of the cross-utility car wasn’t common until 
then. 
Having compiled lists of foreign and domestic manufacturers in operation as well 
as  information  on  market  segmentation  during  our  observation  window,  we  then  put 
together a list of all car lines sold in the US by all manufacturers for each year in our 
sample
8. We also collected segment, make and manufacturer identification information 
on each of these car lines from the Ward’s Automotive Yearbook. We reconfirmed make 
and manufacturer identification information for car lines using the Standard Catalogue of 
American cars and the Standard Catalogue of Imported cars.  
The  segment  identification  for  each  car  line  allows  us  to  track  segment 
compositions over time. That is, for each year, we construct listings of lines that belonged 
to each segment. And by following these segments over the years, we are able to flag the 
appearances of new lines in the segment. When a new line is seen to appear in a segment 
in a given year, for example when Honda’s S2000 line appeared for the first time in the 
luxury sport segment in 1999, we coded that as an entry. Since we had information to link 
lines to ‘makes’, and ‘makes’ to manufacturers, we were also able to correctly assign the 
entries to manufacturers in our sample. In the above case, for instance, we assigned that 
particular  entry  into  the  luxury  sport  segment  to  Honda.  There  were  428  entries  by 
foreign manufacturers in our data during the observation window.  
As we argue in the previous chapter, given that product portfolios of automobile 
manufacturers comprise makes, lines, and cars, we could have counted the appearance of 
a new make or car in a segment as an entry. However, coding entry at the make level is 
                                                 
8 See Chapter 3 for the definition of car line.  
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probably too aggregated and likely to obscure a good deal of the dynamics of entry in the 
industry. Counting cars or models, on the other hand, may give rise to spurious entry 
observations because differences between models are generally minor. Hence, given that 
makes under-count and cars over-count legitimate entries into segments, we coded our 
entries at the line level. That is, we only considered as entry the launch of a new line into 
a segment, and not the introduction of new makes or models or cars. For example, while 
we considered the launch of the BMW Z3 in 1996 in the luxury sport segment as an 
entry, we did not count the addition of specific models, like the Z3 1.9, Z3 2.3 or Z3 2.8 
in 1998 and 1999 as entries. 
Our dependent variable is a count of the number of entries by foreign firms in a 
segment in a given year. That is, for each year, we aggregated entries to the segment 
level. We had 18 years of data and the number of segments per year varied between 23 in 
1986 and 26 in 2003. The number of segment-years, as a result, varied from year to year 
and in the final sample we had 430 segment-years.  
4.3.3  Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
As mentioned above, our dependent variable was a count of the number of foreign 
entries into each segment for each year in our sample. We observed 428 entries over 430 
segment-years. 
Independent variables 
We measure segment density as the count of all car lines in a segment in a given 
year. We include car lines belonging to both US and non-US assemblers in this count. In 
order to test hypothesis 1a, we also include a squared term of this variable.   
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To test if density dependence operates at an industry level as well (hypothesis 
1.b), we created an industry density variable. This, essentially, was the aggregation of 
segment density across all segments for each year of data. It measures the total number of 
car lines in the market in a given year and varies by year, but not by segment-year. To 
test for non-monotonic effects, we also included a quadratic version of this variable. 
To test hypothesis 2, we created foreign segment density. This is similar to the 
segment density variable, but in this case we only count car lines belonging to foreign 
manufacturers. Foreign segment density thus denotes the count of car lines in a segment 
that belong to non-US manufacturers. Again, we also included a quadratic term to test for 
the predicted inverted U shape effect. 
All  independent  variables  were  lagged,  so  they  predict  entries  for  the  year 
following the one for which they were computed. 
Control variables 
We seek to explore the effects of segment and foreign-firm densities on segment 
entry rates. In order to get correct estimates for our coefficients, we sought to control for 
two different types of alternative influences on segment entry. 
First, we controlled for segment-specific influences, such as segment size and 
growth potential which vary  across segments and could potentially affect the density 
effect.  Secondly,  we  included  year-level  effects,  such  as  yearly  industry  wide  sales 
growth, which are time varying, but, within a given year, constant across segments.  
Segment level controls 
It is potentially dangerous to compare intensity of competition across segments 
using  the  variable  segment  density,  without  taking  the  size  of  the  segment  into  
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consideration. For example, a segment with only five car lines could still entail more 
competition between lines than a segment with, say, twenty lines if, in the former case, 
potential demand is modest. To scale the segment density variable across time and across 
segments, we controlled for the potential market size of the segment. We used the total 
number of cars sold in the segment in the previous year as an indicator of segment size.  
Irrespective  of  segment  density,  segments  could  still  be  attractive  to  potential 
entrants if demand in the segment is growing. Competition forces start to set in only 
when the number of incumbents exceeds the carrying capacity of the environment. In 
order to control for the case where carrying capacity itself is expanding, we included a 
lagged value of segment sales growth rate. We use the rate of growth of car sales in the 
segment to proxy for changes in its carrying capacity. 
Keeping with prior literature on entry and founding rates (Hannan et.al., 1995; 
Delacroix  &  Carroll,  1983)  we  also  included  a  count  of  prior  year  entries  into  the 
segment  and  its  quadratic  term.  A  surge  of  previous  entries  could  indicate  favorable 
conditions in the market segment, which attracts future entry as well. However, these 
entries take away from the pool of potential entrants and the availability of resources, and 
thus the positive effect on entry rates should weaken at higher levels of prior entries. This 
variable also helps correct for possible autoregressive influences (Li, Yang & Yue, 2007) 
Time-varying controls 
To control for the general health of the automobile industry during the period 
under study, we included the variable “industry sales”, which measures the total number 
of cars sold in the US automobile market in a given year.  
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There could be other unobserved, time varying influences on segment entry rates. 
To capture these, we also employed year fixed effects by including year dummies into 
our model specification.  
 
Two other issues we need to tackle in our data are the problems of left truncation 
and the potential non-independence of observations. 
Left-truncation 
Given that our observation window starts in 1986, we are potentially susceptible 
to problems of left-truncation. We do not have information on firms that exited the U.S 
market before 1986. Also, while almost all of our firms had made segment entries prior to 
1986, we do not explicitly have information on when these entries occurred. However, 
we are not totally ignoring information from the pre-1986 entries. We do use information 
from these entries to compute our density count variables. In addition, since over 90% of 
the foreign firms in our sample had entered the US market before 1986, left censoring of 
the data at the year 1986 enabled us to separate the foreign market entry and the segment 
entry decision processes. 
Non-independence of observations 
Our  unit  of  analysis  is  the  segment  and  in  our  data  we  pool  observations  on 
segments over time. So in essence, we have repeat observations of segments across years. 
Repeated observations could be a source of non-independence and potentially lead to 
autocorrelation. To reduce this source of potential correlation between observations, we 
included time varying, segment-level control variables (segment size, segment growth 
potential and prior entries into the segment) expecting that these controls will take out the  
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segment-level influences that cause correlation of the error terms within a segment over 
time. Together with year dummies, we believe these control variables should remove the 
sources of correlation between error terms and attenuate the risk of downward biased 
standard  error  estimates  in  our  analyses.  To  be  completely  sure,  however,  we  also 
adjusted  our  standard  errors  to  allow  for  clustering  on  segments,  using  the  “cluster” 
command in STATA. 
4.3.4  Method 
Poisson  regression  is  a  potential  way  to  model  count  dependent  variables. 
Interestingly, “the Poisson model has been used in the analysis of event count data as far 
back as 1898 when von Bortkiewicz conducted his classical study of accidental death by 
mule  kick  in  the  German  army”  (Carroll  &  Wade,  1991:284).  However,  Poisson 
distribution  has  restrictive  assumptions  about  equality  between  conditional  mean  and 
variance of the event count. In our data, the mean number of entries is 0.995 and variance 
is  3.37,  which  suggests  potential  overdispersion.  Using  the  Poisson  model  in  this 
situation  could  produce  smaller  but  erroneous  standard  errors  for  our  coefficient 
estimates.  We  therefore  use  negative  binomial  regression  methods  as  they  have  the 
flexibility  to  accommodate  this  kind  of  overdispersion  (Cameron  &  Trivedi,  1986  in 
Carroll & Wade, 1991).  
 
4.4  RESULTS 
Table  4.1  and  table  4.2  show  descriptive  statistics  and  pair-wise  correlations 
between  the  variables.  The  results  of  the  negative  binomial  regression  model  are 
presented in table 4.3 (standard errors in parentheses).  
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TABLE 4.1 




















 Entry count  0.995  1.836  0  12 
Segment density  11.61  7.64  1  47 
 
Segment foreign density 
 
6.44  6.226  0  42 
Industry density  150.446  13.50  125  173 
Size of the segment  633784.5  634799.6  1  2778662 
Segment sales growth  0.100  1.26  -0.998  21.759 
Industry sales  1.52e07  1406064  1.23e07  1.76e07 
Number  of  entries  in  the 
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A positive sign for a coefficient implies that the corresponding variable has a 
positive effect on the probability of entry into a segment, and a negative sign implies the 
contrary. We entered our hypothesized variables hierarchically into the model to ensure 
robustness of the results. 
Models 1 and 2 are baseline models. In model 1 we allow the baseline entry rate 
to vary with segment size and growth rate, industry sales, and the number of entries in 
the prior year. In model 2 we include the industry density variable and its quadratic term 
as a benchmark against which we can assess the effects of segment density and segment 
foreign density. Model 3 includes segment density while controlling for industry density 
and model 4 is the full model where the density of foreign incumbents in the segment and 
its squared term are entered. 
The  coefficient  of  segment  sales  growth  in  model  1  shows  a  positive  and 
significant effect. This effect remains in all models and supports our notion that entry 
rates are high when the segment resource endowment is growing.  
In model 3, the coefficient of the first order term segment density is positive and 
significant while the quadratic term segment density squared is negative and significant. 
In the same model, we find that the industry density variable remains insignificant. The 
results  on  these  two  variables  together  corroborate  hypothesis  1  to  suggest  that  the 
density effect is stronger at the segment than industry level.   
To test hypothesis 2, we expand our specification in model 4 to include foreign 
density. Foreign density is significant, as well as its square. That is, we find that segment 
entry rates of foreign firms increase up to a point with the number of foreign incumbents 
in the segment, but then decrease. This finding supports our hypothesis that the density 
effect  is  significant  among  groups  with  shared  identities.  Interestingly,  the  segment 
density variable loses its significance when the foreign density variable is added.    
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4.5  DISCUSSION 
Density dependence theory does not provide clear guidance as to the level of 
analysis at which forces of legitimation and competition operate (Singh, 1993, Hannan & 
Carroll,  1992:  Ch.7).  Given  this  ambiguity,  population  ecologists  have  traditionally 
applied the theory at the national industry level, for example, at that of US wineries. 
This  choice  of  level  of  analysis  also  reflects  scholars’  assumptions  about  the 
boundaries of a population. Legitimation and competition, according to the theory, shape 
the evolution of a population. Hence, to assume that the density effect operates at a given 
level of analysis equates to defining the boundaries of the population at that very level as 
well (Lomi, 1995; Singh, 1993). So along with specifying the level of analysis at the 
national industry level, traditional population ecology research has also implicitly drawn 
the  boundaries  of  a  population  at  that  level.  These  issues  of  level  of  analysis  and 
population boundaries, however, have been a recurring point of debate in the literature. 
For example, recent research suggests that populations and density processes are 
more local than nationally bounded and finds evidence for a stronger density effect at 
lower levels of analysis such as within regions, states and cities (Cattani et.al., 2003; 
Greve, 2002, Lomi, 1995; Carroll & Wade, 1991). This stream of research essentially 
disaggregates  populations  into  their  geographical  components  and  explores  density 
dependence at that level.  
In this paper, we seek to add to this kind of refinement of traditional density 
dependence theory. We propose density effects localized within a market segment. Our 
contribution  essentially  lies  in  the  fact  that  we  disaggregate  industries  into  market 
segments and use these segments rather than countries, industries, cities, or regions as 
levels of aggregation within which legitimation and competition operate, and as potential 
boundaries to the density effect.   
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In a nutshell, we argue for a ‘local density dependence’ where density effects are 
localized among firms that have similar resource dependencies, i.e., firms inhabiting the 
same segment and hence proximate in resource space. We also propose ways in which 
legitimation and competition processes work at the segment level; we hypothesize that 
these processes are particularly strong among firms which have similar identities, e.g., 
among foreign firms. 
We test this idea of local density dependence by analyzing the entry rates of 
foreign  firms  into  various  segments  of  the  US  automobile  market,  and  the  effect  of 
densities  of  foreign  and  US  incumbents  in those  segments  on  these  entry  rates.  Our 
results  show  that  segment  density  (the  count  of  car  lines  in  a  market  segment)  has 
stronger effects on entry rates than national-industry density (the corresponding count at 
the national industry level). We consider this supportive of our notion of density effects 
bounded by similar resource dependencies of firms (Hypothesis 1a and 1b). However, in 
a subsequent specification of the model where the density of foreign incumbents in the 
segment  is  included  (i.e.  model  4),  this  variable  is  highly  significant  while  segment 
density loses significance. Given that our dependent variable is the entry rates of foreign 
firms into the US automobile market, we interpret this as support for our notion that even 
within market segments, the density effect is stronger among firms with similar identities 
(hypothesis 2).  
It is interesting to know which of the two forces – legitimation and competition - 
account for the localized density effect. One way to do this is by comparing the ratios of 
estimated coefficients of variables defined at various levels of analysis (see Lomi, 1995). 
In model 3, the ratio of the first order terms of industry density and segment density is 
close to one (1.13). This indicates just a slight difference in the main effect between 
segment  and  national  specifications  of  density.  On  the  quadratic  term  though,  the  
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coefficient in the segment specification (segment density squared) is about five times 
stronger than that at the industry level (industry density squared). Hence, is seems that 
the differences between density effects at local and non-local levels is more dominated 
by the second order (competition) than by the first order (legitimation) effect. Similar 
results  emerge  when  we  look  at  ratios  of  main  and  quadratic  terms  of  industry  and 
segment-foreign density variables as well. The key point in this discussion is that, in line 
with what Hannan & Carroll (1992:146) argue, the observed stronger density effect at 
local levels of aggregation appears to be due mainly to stronger competition rather than 
stronger legitimation.  
Theoretical and empirical progress on the level of analysis problem is important 
in order to push the frontiers of density dependence research. An inappropriate choice of 
highly aggregated levels of analysis can lead to specification errors (Lomi, 1995). First, if 
entry rates do vary across lower levels such as regions and segments, aggregating across 
these levels will hide this variation. The dependent variable will be specified at the wrong 
level. Second, if entry rates vary with region-specific or segment-specific characteristics, 
studies at country or industry levels of analyses, by ignoring region and segment-specific 
covariates, could be prone to specification error (Baum & Amburgey, 2002; Lomi, 1995). 
Some scholars also think the use of different levels of analysis could explain inconsistent 
results in density dependence research on foundings and mortality. For example, Carroll 
&  Wade  (1991:  272)  suggest  that:  “…founding  processes  may  be  more  localized. 
Potential entrepreneurs, while responding to density at the national level, may be even 
more sensitive to local density. Conversely, the effects of competition and legitimation 
on organizational mortality may be greater at the national level”. We believe that our 
study, focusing on the market segment, informs the level of analysis issue in density 
dependence research.   
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Our paper provides significant insights to international business research as well. 
International business researchers studying entry into foreign markets have looked at the 
distribution of foreign entries along a number of dimensions. Scholars have looked at 
how foreign entries are distributed across various entry modes such as joint venture, 
wholly  owned  affiliate,  acquisition  and  greenfield  (e.g.  Hennart,  1991,  Barkema  & 
Vermeulen,  1998).  Others  have  examined  the  variation  in  plant  location  both  across 
potential host countries (Henisz & Delios, 2001) and within a single host country (Chung 
& Alcacer, 2002). Ours is, to the best of our knowledge, the first paper to focus on how 
foreign entries are distributed across market segments in a given host country market, 
and to empirically examine some antecedents of this distribution.  
Our study also adds to the growing number of studies that apply organizational 
ecology  ideas  to  international  business  issues  (Miller  &  Eden,  2006; Kuilman  &  Li, 
2006; Li, Yang & Yue, 2007; Hannan, 1997: Hannan et.al, 1995; Yie & Makino, 2002).  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
This  dissertation  addresses  important  questions  about  the  scope  of  the  firm. 
Specifically, it studies the determinants and growth of the scope of foreign firms in a host 
country market. I examine two different strategic decisions that affect this scope: the first 
is the choice between contractual and equity governance modes in strategic alliances with 
domestic firms, and the second, the decision of which product segments to enter in the 
host market. When a firm chooses an equity alliance over a contractual one, it essentially 
broadens the range of activities it performs in-house, as opposed to externally. And by 
deciding to enter yet another market segment, a firm is essentially expanding its product-
market scope.  
The  first  essay  looks  at  the  choice  between  contractual  and  equity  forms  of 
governance in technology transfer alliances between foreign and local firms in India, and 
how the technology capability of the local Indian partner influences this choice. The 
second  examines  the  determinants  of  the  decisions  made  by  foreign  firms  to  enter 
specific market segments of the US automobile industry. Here I explore the role of the 
local environment – e.g., the presence of incumbents in the segment and the barriers to 
entry  into  the  segment,  the  extent  of  multi-market  competition  the  firm  faces  in  the 
segment, and other factors. The third essay looks at aggregate entry rates of foreign firms 
into various market segments of the US auto industry, again emphasizing the influence of 
various types of incumbents in the market segment. 
 
5.1  MAIN FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
The broader theoretical issue addressed in the first paper is that of the role of firm 
capabilities in determining the boundaries of the firm. Transaction cost theory, using the  
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transaction  as  level  of  analysis,  addresses  the  question  of  how  a  given  transaction  i 
should be organized. Given that firms engaged in the transaction vary in capabilities, this 
question needs to be rephrased as “how should firm j, given its capabilities, organize 
transaction i?” (Williamson, 1999). The paper takes a first cut at this by exploring how 
the technology capability of the recipient influences the transaction costs incurred, and 
thereby, the boundaries of the foreign firm. 
The  key  argument  in  the  paper  is  that  the  level  of  contractual  hazards  in 
technology  alliances,  mainly  due  to  information  asymmetry  and  to  the  risk  of 
misappropriation, depend at least partly on the technology capabilities of the recipient 
Indian firm. We argue that when the Indian recipient exhibits low levels of technology 
assimilation  capability,  the  foreign  firm  needs  to  transfer  to  it  not  only  the  core 
technology  but  also  the  supporting  skills  necessary  to  implement  the  transferred 
technology.  The  predominantly  tacit  and  complex  nature  of  these  skills  leads  to 
information asymmetry problems, and hence these skills are best transferred through an 
equity  joint  venture.  At  higher  levels  of  recipient  technology  assimilation  capability, 
there is less of an information asymmetry problem, but greater appropriation concerns, 
i.e.  concerns  that  the  technologically  capable  recipient  may  misappropriate  the 
technology.  To  resolve  these  potential  appropriation  concerns,  the  contractual  hazard 
mitigating  features  of  equity  governance  become  necessary.  Hence,  we  expect  a  U-
shaped effect of recipient technology capability on the choice of equity governance in the 
alliance, with the likelihood of equity form of governance being the highest at both lower 
and upper ranges of the technology capability of the recipient firm. 
Our findings, based on a survey of 126 alliances between foreign and local firms 
in India, reveal new insights. We do find a significant effect of the recipient’s technology 
assimilation capability. However, contrary to our expectations, we find only a negative  
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relationship between the technology assimilation capability of the Indian recipient and 
the choice of equity governance. In our sample, it appears that information costs are more 
relevant determinants than appropriation concerns. The appropriation concerns that are 
supposed  to  push  firms  towards  equity  joint  ventures  at  higher  levels  of  recipient 
assimilation capability do not seem to apply in our case, probably because foreign firms 
do not see local firms from developing countries as capable of harmful misappropriation 
and hence as credible threats. Based on this finding, we propose that the relevant sources 
of contractual hazards in technology transactions are context dependent. If the relevant 
sources of transaction costs vary from setting to setting, then conceptions of transaction 
costs  being  solely  a  function  of  appropriability  hazards  (e.g.,  Sampson,  2004)  have 
limited generalizability. 
The key conceptual contribution in chapter 3 lies in the application of various 
theoretical perspectives to the market segment level. By adopting different perspectives 
to examine decisions of foreign firms on whether or not to enter a given segment in a 
given year, this paper opens up a new and interesting level of analysis – the firm-segment 
level –, and explores whether and how organizational theory can be brought to predict 
firm behavior at this level.  
Our contribution is to use multiple theoretical perspectives to predict entry into 
segments. Most of these perspectives have not been employed at the market-segment 
level of analysis. Each perspective holds specific assumptions about managerial action 
and decision-making, and differs from the others in predictive content.   
   The  third  essay  addresses  research  in  population  ecology.  There  is  still  no 
consensus in that literature about the appropriate level at which the two central processes 
of  legitimation  and  competition  play  out,  and  hence  about  the  appropriate  levels  of 
analysis at which density dependence must be studied (Singh, 1993; Hannan & Carroll,  
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1992: Ch.7). Originally theorists were interested in the temporal evolution of populations 
and paid little attention to spatial boundaries. They implicitly assumed that legitimation 
and competition operated at the level of a national industry. Recent evidence, however, 
suggests that the density effect is strongest at lower levels of aggregation such as that of 
regions,  states,  and  cities  (Carroll  &  Wade,  1991),  suggesting  that  populations  and 
density processes are more geographically localized (Cattani et.al., 2003; Greve, 2002, 
Lomi, 1995). While this is indeed welcome progress, most of these studies have looked 
at density effects in geographic space. In this essay, we seek to expand this research by 
examining whether density effects are also localized in resource space. The contribution 
essentially lies in the fact that we use market segments, rather than cities, states and 
regions,  and  firm  identities  (i.e.,  foreign  vis-à-vis  domestic)  as  levels  of  aggregation 
within  which  legitimation  and  competition  operate,  and  hence,  also  as  potential 
boundaries to the density effect.  
 
5.1.2  Legitimation and competition at the market segment level – A discussion 
According  to  density  dependence  theorists,  legitimation  and  competition 
processes underlie the link between density and entry rates. At lower levels of segment 
density, additional entries serve to legitimize the segment and thus attract  yet newer 
entries. This legitimation effect wanes, however, as the number of incumbents in the 
segment  increases.  Higher  levels  of  segment  density  trigger  greater  competition  for 
resources, and this dissuades new entries into the segment. 
Testing in chapter 3 this explanation for entry into segments, I do not find an 
inverted U, but instead a linear and negative relationship between segment density and 
the  probability  of  entry.  This  result  is  intriguing,  as  it  implies  that  the  predominant 
determinant  of  entry  is  the  extent  of  competition  already  in  the  segment  and  not  
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legitimation. If legitimation is important there should be a positive effect of density on 
entry at lower levels of segment density. 
However,  before  completely  dismissing  the  role  of  legitimation,  I  retested  its 
effect in chapter 4 by modifying the empirical specification in two ways: first, I used 
Poisson  regression,  an  econometric  model  commonly  used  in  density  dependence 
research; second, I split the segment density variable into its foreign and domestic firm 
components to examine the effect on the entry rates of foreign firms of the density of 
foreign firms in the segment. Once these adjustments are made, I find a quite strong 
legitimation effect in chapter 4. In the model 4 where all variables are entered together, I 
do not get significant results for the segment density variable, but the foreign segment 
density variable yields the expected inverted U prediction.  
If the evidence for legitimation hadn’t emerged in chapter 4, we could have more 
confidently dismissed the role of legitimation. However, since that isn’t the case, I can 
only  speculate  on  why  these  seemingly  contradictory  results  for  density  dependence 
appear in chapters 3 and 4. 
The first thing to keep in mind is that while they both explore the effect of density 
on  entry  into  segments,  these  two  chapters  have  different  empirical  designs.  On  the 
dependent variable side, chapter 3 examines whether or not a given foreign firm enters a 
segment  in  a  given  year,  while  chapter  4  looks  at  aggregate  entry  rates  –  counts  of 
foreign entries in a segment in a given year. These different dependent variables suggest 
different levels of analysis – the firm-segment-year in chapter 3 and the segment-year in 
chapter 4 – and correspondingly, different econometric models – discrete time logit in 
chapter 3 and Poisson regression in chapter 4. So essentially, chapter 3 examines the 
effect of legitimation and competition on an individual firm’s behaviour, and chapter 4, 
on the collective behaviour of firms. There are differences on the right-hand side as well.  
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In chapter 3, along with a host of fixed effects and control variables, I include measures 
of multi-market competition and prior entry experience of the firm. Given the different 
level of analysis in chapter 4, I cannot use these variables. 
It is thus difficult to rule out the role of differences in empirical models across 
both chapters in the dissimilar results I get for density dependence theory. That is, it is 
hard  to  tell  if  the  different  results  are  simply  an  artefact  of  different  empirical 
specifications or due to more substantive reasons. 
With the above caveat, one substantive explanation is that legitimation effects are 
strongest among firms that share both similar identities as well as resource dependencies, 
e.g., within sub-populations of foreign firms in the same market segment. At levels of 
aggregation where firms only share similar demand, such as among firms in the same 
market  segment,  competition  effects  are  predominant.  This  shows  in  the  results  of 
chapters 3 and 4 - in chapter three there is no evidence for the legitimating effect of 
segment density; in chapter 4, while density of foreign firms is significant, that of both 
foreign and domestic firms in the segment is not.  
 
5.2 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
There are a couple of ways in which the research reported here can be taken 
forward. 
In chapter 2 we examine the choice between licensing and joint venture as modes 
of governing strategic alliances. However, ours is a cross-sectional study where we look 
at the choices firms make at a single point in time. An interesting avenue for future 
research is to examine how governance forms evolve over time, essentially whether and 
under  what  conditions  licensing  agreements  get  replaced  by  joint  ventures.  With 
longitudinal data one could also examine if information and appropriation costs become 
less important once the foreign firm has acquired some experience in the host country.  
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A second way to build on the results presented here is to look at the performance 
implications of choosing licensing over joint venture or vice-versa. From a transaction 
cost  point  of  view,  making  the  right  governance  choice  should  result  in  superior 
performance. One could examine whether making the transaction cost-efficient choice 
does indeed lead to superior alliance performance. 
It  is  possible  that  our  results  in  chapters  3  and  4  are  specific  to  the  specific 
industry and observation window we have chosen. Future research could also seek to 
replicate  our  study  in  other  empirical  contexts.  Future  research  could  increase  the 
generalizability of our results by studying segment entries in other industries, and by 
using different time periods. One promising avenue for theoretical development is to 
tease out specific conditions under which one perspective will have stronger effects or 
predictability relative to the others. A longer panel would also allow us to examine if 
certain  theories  predict  relatively  better  during  specific  stages  in  the  growth  of  the 
industry. This would help us better understand some of the boundaries within which each 
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SAMMENVATTING 
SUMMARY IN DUTCH 
 
Deze  dissertatie  bestaat  uit  drie  studies  die  elk  de  expansie  van  buitenlandse 
bedrijven  naar  nieuwe  markten  en  de  daarop  volgende  evolutie  van  deze  expansies 
onderzoeken. De leidraad die door deze drie studies loopt, is de focus op de wijdte van de 
activiteiten  van  het  buitenlandse  bedrijf  in  het  gastland  en  op  hoe  de  wijdte  van  de 
activiteiten wordt bepaald door lokale bedrijven en de omgeving. Ik bestudeer zowel de 
breedte van de activiteiten van het buitenlandse bedrijf in termen van haar economische 
grenzen  –  wat  het  bedrijf  zelf  produceert  en  wat  het  koopt  –  als  in  termen  van  de 
produktmarkt positionering van het bedrijf – de produktsegmenten die het bedrijf bezet in 
het gastland. 
In  het  bijzonder  bestudeer  ik  twee  verschillende  strategische  beslissing  die 
bedrijven moeten maken wanneer ze een nieuw land betreden. De eerste beslissing is de 
keuze tussen contractuele en hiërarchische governance-vormen in strategische allianties, 
en de tweede beslissing heeft betrekking op welk marktsegment het bedrijf betreedt in het 
gastland. Beide strategische keuzes beïnvloeden de grenzen van het bedrijf. Door het 
verkiezen van een equity joint venture boven een licentiecontract vergroot een bedrijf 
haar grenzen. Het vergroot namelijk het spectrum van activiteiten dat binnenshuis, in 
tegenstelling  tot  extern,  wordt  uitgevoerd.  En  door  de  beslissing  om  nog  een  ander 
marktsegment  te  betreden,  vergroot  een  bedrijf  haar  produktmarktwijdte.  In  de  drie 
studies in deze dissertatie onderzoek ik hoe lokale bedrijven of de lokale omgeving in het 
gastland deze beslissingen beïnvloeden. 
De  eerste  studie  kijkt  naar  de  keuze  tussen  contractuele  en  hiërarchische 
governance-vormen  in  allianties  die  technologie  overhevelen  tussen  de  buitenlandse  
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partner en de lokale partner in India, en naar hoe het technologische vermogen van de 
lokale Indiase partner deze keuze beïnvloedt. De tweede studie bestudeert of en waarom 
een  buitenlands  bedrijf  een  bepaald  marktsegment  in  de  Amerikaanse  automobiel 
industrie  betreedt.    Hier  onderzoek  ik  de  rol  van  de  lokale  omgeving  zoals  de 
aanwezigheid van andere bedrijven, barrières om het segment te betreden, de omvang 
van “multi-market” competitie waarmee een bedrijf wordt geconfronteerd, enzovoorts. In 
een derde studie, waarin ik weer de invloed van het reeds aanwezige aantal verschillende 
bedrijven in het segment benadruk, kijk ik naar geaggregeerde toetredingsratio’s van 
buitenlandse bedrijven in de Amerikaanse automobiel industrie.  
Soms  moeten  bedrijven  samenwerken  met  lokale  bedrijven  door  allianties  te 
vormen  wanneer  ze  een  nieuwe  markt  betreden.  Hoewel  dat  duidelijk  is,  weten  we 
relatief weinig over welke governance-vormen zulke allianties zouden moeten aannemen. 
De literatuur met betrekking tot alliantie-governance (e.g., Oxley 1997; 1999; Pisano 
1989),  focust  zich  vooral  vanuit  een  transactiekosten  perspectief  op  factoren  op  het 
niveau van de alliantie zelf, zoals de functionele en geografische wijdte van de alliantie, 
maar informeert ons nauwelijks over hoe de capaciteiten van een bedrijf de governance 
keuze beïnvloeden. Mijn eerste studie probeert deze lancune te vullen door, controlerend 
voor  de  karakteristieken  van  de  technologie  die  gedeeld  wordt,  het  effect  van 
technologische capaciteiten van het lokale bedrijf op de keuze tussen contractuele (een 
licentiecontract)  en  hiërarchische  (een  equity  joint  venture)  governance-vormen  te 
onderzoeken. Ik argumenteer dat de informatie- en toeëigeningskosten die hand in hand 
gaan met technologische transacties afhangen van zowel de karakteristieken van de te 
overdragen  kennis  en  de  opnamecapacititeit  voor  technologie  van  het  ontvangende 
bedrijf. Ik test mijn hypotheses gebruikmakend van data die verkregen zijn door middel 
van een enquête die uitgevoerd is bij 126 allianties tussen buitenlandse en lokale Indiase  
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bedrijven, en vind dat wanneer de opnamecapacititeit voor technologie van de lokale 
Indiase bedrijven laag is de alliantie gestuctureerd wordt als een equity joint venture in 
plaats  van  een  contractuele  joint  venture.  Dit  is,  mijns  inziens,  het  geval  omdat  de 
zwakke capaciteiten van de Indiase partner het noodzakelijk maakt voor de buitenlandse 
partner om ondersteunende vaardigheden over te brengen zodat de Indiase partner de 
essentiële technologie kan absorberen. Omdat de meeste van deze vaardigheden impliciet 
zijn,  wordt  de  overdracht  middels  een  contractuele  oplossing  bemoeilijkt  door 
informatieproblemen  welke  opportunistisch  gedrag  verminderende  eigenschappen  van 
equity governance-vormen onontbeerlijk maken. 
De tweede studie bestudeert de wijdte van de activiteiten van het buitenlandse 
bedrijf in de produktmarkt van het gastland. Produktmarkten zijn zelden homogeen en 
bestaan meestal uit verschillende segmenten waarin de kopers gelijkaardige smaken en 
voorkeuren  hebben.  De  wijdte  van  de  activiteiten  van  het  buitenlandse  bedrijf  in  de 
produktmarkt van het gastland op elk gegeven moment bestaat uit de opeenvolgende 
beslissingen die het heeft gemaakt in het verleden met betrekking tot het al dan wel of 
niet betreden van een bepaald marktsegment. De overige omstandigheden gelijkblijvend, 
hoe  groter  het  aantal  segmenten  een  bedrijf  verkiest  te  betreden,  hoe  wijder  de 
activiteiten  van  het  bedrijf.  Deze  studie  onderzoekt  de  determinanten  van  zulke 
beslissingen om een marktsegment te betreden. Gebruikmakend van respectievelijk de 
strategisch  management,  strategisch  momentum,  populatie  ecologie  en  industriële 
organisatie perspectieven, voorspel ik dat de kans dat een buitenlands bedrijf een bepaald 
segment  betreedt  in  een  bepaald  jaar  afhangt  van  de  omvang  van  “multi-market” 
competitie met concurrenten, de voorafgaande ervaring in dat bepaald segment en het 
aantal actieve bedrijven in dat segment – met  andere  woorden, de dichtheid van dat 
segment.  Ik  test  deze  hypotheses  gebruikmakend  van  data  over  de  toetreding  in  
  134     
marktsegmenten  van  buitenlandse  bedrijven  in  de  Amerikaanse  automobiel  industrie 
gedurende bijna twee decennia (1986-2003). De analyse van de data geeft aan dat al de 
bovenvermelde factoren van belang zijn. Multi-market competitie en de voorafgaande 
toetredingen van bedrijf in een segment hebben een non-monotonische invloed. Meer 
specifiek, een voorafgaande toetreding heeft een positief maar afnemend effect op de 
kans dat een bedrijf een bepaald segment betreedt terwijl multi-market competitie een 
omgekeerd U-vormig effect heeft waarbij de kans tot toetreding eerst toeneemt maar na 
een bepaald punt afneemt. Het aantal actieve bedrijven in dat bepaald segment of de 
dichtheid  van  dat  segment  vermindert  de  kans  dat  een  bedrijf  ertoe  toetreedt.  Deze 
resultaten stemmen overeen met de voorspellingen die voortkomen uit de multi-market 
competitie, strategisch momentum, en spatiale competitie perspectieven. Ik vind echter 
enkel  beperkt  bewijs  voor  het  populatie  ecologie  perspectief  wat  een  omgekeerd  U-
vormig effect van segment dichtheid voorspelt. 
Het  beperkte  bewijs  voor  het  populatie  ecologie  perspectief  is  intrigerend. 
Daarom,  onderzoek  ik  dit  verder  in  mijn  derde  studie.  Ik  gebruik  een  alternatieve 
econometrische specificatie die vaak gebruikt wordt in populatie ecologie studies die 
naar  de  oprichting  van  bedrijven  kijken,  en  belangrijker,  die  de  grenzen  van  het 
dichtheidseffect  bestuderen.  Traditioneel  gezien  hebben  “density-dependence” 
onderzoekers  verondersteld  dat  het  proces  van  legitimatie  en  competitie,  welke  de 
belangrijkste determinanten zijn van het density-dependence effect, spelen op het niveau 
van de gehele populatie. Recente studies zijn echter begonnen met het benadrukken dat 
er ruimtelijke heterogeniteit bestaat in populaties en hebben gesuggereerd dat het effect 
speelt op het niveau van nationale sub-eenheden, zoals regio’s and steden (Cattani et.al, 
2003; Lomi, 1995; Carroll & Wade, 1991). Ik bouw voort op deze recent contributies en 
benadruk twee alternatieve niveaus van aggregatie die functioneren als een beperking op  
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het  effect  van  legitimatie  en  competitie,  en  daardoor  ook  op  het  density-dependence 
effect. Allereerst kunnen industrieën opgedeeld worden in segmenten, die overeenkomen 
met  homogene  vormen  van  vraag.  Ik  argumenteer  dat  het  density-dependence  effect 
sterker is op het niveau van segmenten dan op het niveau van industrieën, dus tussen 
bedrijven die afhankelijk zijn van gelijkaardige kopers. Ten tweede stel ik voor dat het 
dichtheidseffect alle bedrijven niet op eenzelfde manier beïnvloedt maar dat de bedrijven 
die  een  gelijkaardige  identiteit  hebben  sterker  beïnvloed  worden.  En  gegeven  dat 
buitenlandse  bedrijven  gelijkaardige  identiteiten  hebben  ten  opzichte  van  lokale 
bedrijven, zullen de density-dependence effecten sterker zijn in de sub-populatie van 
buitenlandse bedrijven dan tussen buitenlandse en lokale bedrijven. De resultaten die ik 
verkregen heb door het analyseren van data over de toetredingsratio’s van buitenlandse 
bedrijven in de automobiel industrie in de Verenigde Staten bevestigen mijn hypotheses. 
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